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
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

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
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
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
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# INSURANCE FOR LIBERTY LARGE OR SMALL*

MAJOR A.K. AWASTHI ENGRS

*"There are no friends or enemies in the affairs of nations, only self-interests."*

A NATION'S armed forces are the nation's best insurance for liberty. Majority of the western nations have opted for small, highly sophisticated armed forces with capability for immediate expansion. We have a comparatively larger standing armed forces with very limited capability for expansion. A comparison of military manpower of certain countries is given in Table I. In the context of our socio-economic constraints, international environment and likely threats to our security, should India have a small, selective, highly trained and well-equipped modern force or continue to have a large voluntary armed forces as at present ?

It is universally accepted that the present era is one of short and limited wars aiming at limited gains. This may be true for conflicts involving two super powers or two countries having almost same armed forces which are controlled by the apron strings of the super powers. But is it true in the context of a conflict between a country which is aspiring to be a super power and a country with modest means. Security pacts or understandings with super powers are no guarantee of a nation's security. Many a time the super powers have closed their eyes or held their hand till it was too late.

A civilian mind is likely to equate limited wars having limited objectives with limited means, which is likely to encourage aggressive designs and invariably lead to an unnecessarily protracted wars. Despite ideas regarding a possible decrease in the utility of military forces in their national politics, the basic mission of the military establishments remains the winning of wars, and in peace time the maintenance of sufficient strength and readiness to create a deterrent to war.

As far as possible, a nation's defence capability should be sufficient to deter any aggression by likely adversaries. The standing armed forces should be sufficient to take on the first onslaught and be capable of inflicting damage to the enemy to make him realise the folly of his aggression. Further, the nation should have the capability

* Cash Winning Gold Medal Essay 1978 (open to all officers) (since the Essay was written Pakistan has continued to augment its armed forces at feverish pace. ed)

**TABLE**
**COMPARISON OF**

| Sr. No. | Country | Population | Military Manpower 1974 | | | Estimated total men of military age (18-45 years) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Total Regular | Para Military | Trained Reservists | |
| 1. | China | 866,000,000 | 3,100,000 | 300,000 5 to 7 million Militia | NA | 200,000,000 |
| 2. | India | 610,000,000 | 956,000 | 100,000 | 180,000 TA-50,000 | 126,500,000 |
| 3. | Indonesia | 140,700,100 | 270,000 | 130,000 | NA | 20,600,100 |
| 4. | Iran | 33,200,000 | 250,000 | 70,000 | 315,000 | 6,400,000 |
| 5 | Pakistan | 60,170,000 | 392,000 | 120,000 | 500,000 | 15,600,000 |
| 6. | Japan | 109,330,000 | 233,000 | — | 39,000 | 25,000,000 |
| 7. | USA | 215,810,000 | 2,130,000 | — | 931,000 | 39,000,000 |
| 8. | USSR | 253,300,000 | 3,575,000 | 300,000 | 2,800,000 | 47,000,000 |
| 9. | France | 52,470,000 | 502,500 | 70,000 | 540,000 | 12,000,000 |
| 10. | Israel | 3,260,000 | 33,500 112,000 conscripts. | 9,000 | 254,000 | |

*Source* - Military

—I

## MILITARY MANPOWER

| % of regular forces to man of military age | Type of Military Service | Relative State of Services | | | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Army | Navy | Air Force | |
| 2 | Army – 2-4 yrs. AF —3-5 yrs. Navy – 4-6 yrs. | 2,800,000 | 230,000 | 220,000 | |
| 1.1 | Voluntary | 826,000 | 30,000 | 100,000 | |
| 1.6 | Selective | 200,000 | 40,000 | 30,000 | |
| 3.9 | Mil—2 yrs. | 175,000 | 15,000 | 60,000 | |
| 1.9 | Selective—2 yrs. | 365,000 | 10,000 | 17,000 | |
| 1.1 | Voluntary | 154,000 | 38,100 | 40,900 | |
| 5.7 | Voluntary | 785,000 | 536,000<br>197,000 | 612,000 | |
| 6.8 | Army) AF ) 1 year<br>Navy and) Border ) 2-3 yrs.<br>guards ) | 185,000 | 500,000 | 400,000 | |
| — | Mil service—12 months | 331,500 | 69,000 | 102,000 | |
| — | Men-36 months<br>Women-20 months | 15,000<br>110,000 conscripts | 35,000<br>1,000 conscripts | 15,000<br>1,000 | |

Balance—1974-75.

and infrastructure to expand its armed forces for a prolonged war of attrition, if required.

Apart from the armed forces, defence capability includes scientific advancement and solid industrial and agricultural base. The planning process for an optimum defence force begins with the appreciation of likely threats, then proceeds to tailor forces to counter these threats. However, gaps do arise between ideal force and the budgetary constraint which troubles even the most developed countries.

GEO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

India is a large landmass surrounded on three sides by the ocean and Himalayas in the North. The type of climate and nature of terrain in which our forces are likely to fight varies from the deserts of Kutch and Rajasthan, flat plains of Punjab interspersed with canals and distributaries, mountains of Himalayas, Gangetic plains of UP and Bihar and the thick jungles and paddy fields of Bengal and Assam.

The Himalayas is no longer impregnable. The construction of a highway through Karakoram ranges, deployment of Chinese missiles in Tibet and Sinkiang and laying of a pipeline to Tibet have made our Northern borders highly vulnerable.

We have a 4000-mile coastline and 1,280 island territories. The security of our 200-mile economic zone has also become increasingly important since the discovery of oil in 1974 off the Western coast. The ocean around us contain a large quantity of hidden wealth, which may not be required now but may be urgently required in the not-so-distant future.

Our immediate neighbours are Pakistan, China, Napal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka. Out of these, only two countries are sufficiently inimical and may pose a military threat to India. These are Pakistan and China.

The two super powers, i.e., US and USSR have reached a state of military preparedness where the aggressed can absorb the first nuclear blow and retain sufficient forces for retaliation. Thus the element of surprise in striking the first blow, does not guarantee the aggressor the immunity from unacceptable damage. This state has induced them to follow a policy of detente with each other. Apart from their interests in the Indian Ocean, the Indian sub-continent is important to the two super powers due to the following :—

(a) US policy of containment of USSR.

(b) USSR efforts to neutralise the US influence and policy of containment of China, with which it has ideological differences and border disputes.

PAKISTAN

We have so far fought three limited wars with Pakistan in the last

thirsty-one years. The first and second ones were to settle the Kashmir problem by force and the third one in 1971, due to the atrocities committed by Pakistan in its erstwhile Eastern wing and forced eviction of 12 million members of its minority community. Both in 1965 and 1971 arms supplied and political support from powerful external powers pre-disposed Pakistan to war in the sub-continent. The total losses and gains, so far have been :—

(a) We have lost a substantial portion of Kashmir to Pakistan which is rightly ours.

(b) The erstwhile East Pakistan has emerged as an independent nation in Bangladesh. Bangladesh were friendly to us in the beginning, but later in Aug. 75, after the overthrow of Sheikh Mujib, it went under the control of its armed forces and the relations are not so friendly at present.

(c) Capability of religion to forge a nation has received a severe jolt.

Unlike India, Pakistan has been in political turbulance and instability since the time of its inception. Most of the time, it has been under Army rule. Mr. Bhutto*, who headed a civilian government after 1971, is in jail, facing a death sentence. Inspite of efforts towards normalisation of relations. Pakistan and India are still not free from mutual suspicions.

Since 1971, Pakistan has increased its Army to two armoured and sixteen infantry divisions. It is increasing its capability for air-mobile operations. The comparison of the two Air Forces and Navies is given in Table 2 and 3 respectively. These do not take into consideration the support it is likely to get from friendly oil-rich Islamic nations. It is establishing an air defence ground environment system comparable to modern ones under installation in Israel and Taiwan and is being completed by 1981.

TABLE—II

**COMPARATIVE STRENGTH—NAVIES**

| | India | Pakistan | China |
|---|---|---|---|
| Air Craft Carriers | 1 | — | — |
| Destroyers | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| Destroyer Escorts | — | — | 9 |
| Cruisers | 2 | 4 | — |
| Frigates | 25 | 1 | — |
| Submarines (Various Types) | 6 | 8 | 60 |
| Patrol Boats (Various Types) | 16 | 19 | 500 |
| Mine Sweepers | 8 | 7 | 50 |

*Source*—Military Balance 1977-78.

*Since executed.

TABLE—III

COMPARATIVE COMBAT AIRCRAFT STRENGTH

| | India | Pakistan |
|---|---|---|
| Total Combat Aircraft | 670 | 247 |
| Light Bomber | 50 | 11 |
| Fighter/Ground Attack Aircraft | 215 | 160 |
| Fighter-Bomber | — | 30 |
| Intercepters | 400 | — |

The above does not take into consideration the support that Pakistan is likely to get from other rich Islamic nations.

*Source*—Military Balance 1977-78.

Pakistan is trying its best to procure nuclear reprocessing facility. The proposed plant would be economically viable only when it has to reprocess spent fuel recovered from at least 10 power reactors of 1000 MW each. Pakistan does not expect to have these numbers of nuclear plants in commission before the turn of the century. Hence, while in the near future the threat from Pakistan, could only be on a conventional plane, it will not be long before nuclear dimension is added to it as well.

CHINA

China occupied Tibet in 1954. It attacked us in 1962 and is still occupying 40,000 square kilometres of our territory. Further, it has laid claims on a large territory along our borders and borders with Nepal and Bhutan. Our border disputes have not been discussed yet since 1962. According to Madhu Limaye, "It needs to be reiterated that not one reasonable person, who has expressed his dissent from the new initiatives in India-China relations, has argued that any other course except the peaceful settlement of the border disputes should be adopted".

Relations with USSR, USA and Japan have been more central to the concern of China than the Indian sub-continent. China perceives two issues which may pose a threat to its security in the sub-continent. The first is the danger posed by any Indian government that, in Chinese eyes, does not fully accept the Chinese control of Tibet. The second involves the broader threat to its general security posed by India supported by one or both super powers. On December 4, 1971, the Chinese representative said before the UN Security Council, "The Indian government asserts that the purpose of sending troops to invade East Pakistan is to help the refugees of East Pakistan to return to their homeland. This is utterly untenable. At present, there are in India, large numbers of so-called refugees from Tibet. The Indian government

is also grooming Dalai Lama, the Chieftain of Tibtan counter revolutionary rebellion. According to Indian government assertions, are you going to use this also as a basis of aggression against China".

China's national policy objectives have never been officially published. Hence the rusultant ambiguity gives the Peking administration its necessary freedom of manoeuvre. These objectives are generally believed to be, maintenance of national security, achievement of great power status, ability to be sustained without allies, achievement of a preponderant regional influence, rectification of China's frontiers and leadership of all Marxist-Leninists in the world.

Over the years, the Chinese have achieved a capability of inducting and maintaining a large force in Tibet. With the completion of Karakoram highway, they can induct a substantial quantum of forces into the heartland of India. They are supporting Pakistan, encouraging Bangladesh against us and have assisted the insurgents at our North Eastern borders. They have established missile sites in Tibet. These missiles are MRBMs, which means that the target for these are neither in USA nor European USSR, but in India. Further, the Chinese are on the threshold of a sufficiently credible nuclear deterrent to a Soviet first strike and their civil defence programme is also reported to be well advanced. Their relations with USA, Western countries and Japan have also been improving since Nixon's China visit in 1972.

PLA has 121 Infantry Divisions and 12 Armoured Divisions. Their major commitment is along the Sino-Soviet border where 43 to 45 Russian Divisions are stationed. Though they have a large number of submarines, their navy is reported to be effective in coastal waters only. They are planning to build nuclear submarines. Chinese military technology is reported to be approximately 15 years behind that of USA and USSR but they are determined to catch up fast with their modernisation programmes.

India's modest initiatives since 1976, towards normalizing relations with China have not been very successful; we have exchanged ambassadors and our foreign minister was scheduled to visit China in response to an invitation by a non-official Chinese delegation but the visit has been postponed due to reasons of ill-health. According to Madhu Limaye. "only when India becomes strong in agriculture, industry, science and defence, we will be able to establish a more normal relationship with the Chinese".

## INDIA'S DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS

Since the time of its birth as an independent nation, India has been following a policy of non-alignment and peaceful coexistence. We are a secular and democratic country. We have been advocates of peace and disarmament. We want to be left to ourselves to overcome our innumerable economic problems. In recent years, we have gained con-

siderable ground in the fields of agriculture, industry and science, but we still have a considerable distance to go. We carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974 and are capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons. We are planning to put another satellite around the earth with our own indigenously produced rocket. This technology can assist us in gaining IRBM capability. But voluntarily, we have renounced the use of our nuclear and space technology for military purposes. If the experience of the past thirtyone years is a guide, it brings out one lesson glaringly, that pacifist tendencies are no guarantee against aggression. If the Chinese had not attacked us in early sixties, we would not have learnt this valuable lesson and the outcome of Indo-Pak wars would have been different.

As brought out earlier, the threat to India's security is from Pakistan and China, individually or collectively. We should not be surprised if in future Bangladesh joins them to collect its own pound of flesh. To counter these threats the minimum we require is parity with Pakistan and at least 10 to 12 divisions to protect our Northern Frontiers. Further, Pakistan and China, both, are modernising their forces and we should also achieve at least as much of modernisation as the countries which are likely to threaten us.

We have the 1971 Treaty of friendship and security with USSR, which is China's main enemy. If in future, China is able to mend its fences with USSR or build-up a credible nuclear second strike capability, as super powers have, it will be difficult for any of the super powers to actively involve themselves against China. Chinese have always shown an utter disregard for the world opinion and they will continue to do so.

Ultimately, India will have to depend on its resources to counter any Chinese aggression, as and when they decide to settle the border dispute by force, unless of course, we hand over the disputed territories to them on a plate to pacify them. But how long can we keep surrendering our national interests to other powers to pacify them ? We are the second most populous country in the world. Have we decided to remain in the background for eternity ?

Our long term policy should be to keep on advancing economically and in defence capability so that if not in the near future but sometime in the distant future we can be our own masters. Scientific and technological developments take a long time. The earlier we achieve the second strike nuclear deterrent, the earlier we will be free from external interference to pursue our economic goals. After all the ability of a nation to support adequately its important national interests depends, in the final analysis on the state of its economy and capability for defence.

TRAINED RESERVISTS AND PARA-MILITARY FORCES

Budgetary constraints hinder even the developed nations in maintaining ideal defence forces. The western nations have circumvented this problem by maintaining reserves of trained manpower vhich can be readily mobilised. In a general sense, reserves also help to deter war and, if deterrence fails, help to defeat aggression by means sufficient to serve political objectives.

In US Army, the cost of maintaining one activc soldier is equivalent to the cost of maintaining 13.1 reservists. The percentage and number of reservists in US Army is given in Table IV. Their reserve cost comparison is given in Table V. The role of US reserves is to augment the active armed forces in a national emergency. The reserve component of the active army is organised as training divisions, manoeuvre battalions, combat service support companies, strategic military intelligence detachments and so on. The Army National Guard is an organised civilian component of the Army. It has the mission of attaining a state of training which permits its immediate expansion to war strength and employment anywhere in the world. As a state force, its mission is to be ready for any emergency duty under state authorities eg, riot control and disaster relief etc. Except when specifically ordered into federal service, the National Guard remains under the command of state government.

TABLE—IV

**US ARMED FORCES—PERCENTAGE AND NUMBERS OF RESERVISTS IN TOTAL STRENGTH**

| Category | Air Force | Army | Marines | Navy | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Active | 5,80,000 | 7,89,000 | 1,91,772 | 5,20,651 | Aug. 76 |
| Reserve | 2,24,576 | 7,06,500 | 1,12,657 | 3,73,145 | Aug. 76 |
| Total Reserve as % | 8,05,377 27.9 | 1,495,500 47.2 | 3,04,429 37 | 8,93,796 41.7 | Aug. 76 |

TABLE V

**US ARMED FORCES RESERVE COST COMPARISON**

| Unit | Active | Reserve |
|---|---|---|
| Air Defence Squadron | 100 | 40-46 |
| Destroyer Squadron | 100 | 60 |
| Infantry Battalion | 100 | 21 |

*Source*—Effective Use of Reserve Component—Capt John T. Fischet US Army Reserve—Military Review March 77; Pages 58 to 62.

The Bundeswehr of Federal Republic of Germany has three categories of reservists-ready, alert and replacement reservists. A pictorial representation of Bundeswehr mobilization system is given in Table VI. Though it has only 4, 95,000 active soldiers, the total mobilized strength of Bundeswehr at M plus 72 hours is 1.2 million men. The enlisted men leave the reserves at 45 years and officers at 60 years. The forward elements are fully manned. The further one looks to the rear, the more one is dependent on mobilization. Activation of the ready reserve fills the most forward positions and key personnel positions first. The activation of alert reservists is a matter of getting the people to the weapons and equipment stored in unit sets in rear areas. In case the war lasts longer the Bundeswehr has replacement reserves of 1.2 million men. Supporting and organising a military force in the homeland has many advantages compared to maintaining an expeditionary force. The civil sector in Germany represents an enormous

TABLE—VI

**BUNDESWEHR RESERVE SYSTEM—FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

| | |
|---|---|
| | 1.2 million<br>Replacement reserve essentially a manpower pool of older reservists. No mobilisation assignments.<br>Individual replacements. |
| Total mobilised Bundeswehr at M plus 72 hours is 1.2 million men. This feature represents war time strength. | 700,000<br>Alert reservists, all have specific mobilisation assignments known both to reservists and units. Will be available within 72 hours of notification. |
| | 4,95,000 Active soldiers. Peacetime table of organisation and equipment, includes people in student status, basic training and 30,000 ready reservists, subject to recall by Defence Minister. |

*Source*:—Bundeswehr Reserve and Mobilisation System—Lt Col Henry G Cole, US Army—Military Review—Nov. 1977 ; Pages 76 to 82.

military potential, eg, the German Army provides only those bull-dozers to its engineer battalions which are necessary in peacetime. Rest is made available to the military at the time of war. Exercises involving inspecting and requistioning of civil transportation and heavy construction equipment are conducted regularly in Germany. No wonder, a 3,20 000 men German Army presents a 12 Division force while 7,18,000 men US Army produces only a 16 divisions force. The Territorial Army is manned by active duty personnel at approx 20 percent of wartime strength. It is organised on an area basis and its mission is to ensure freedom of movement of NATO Forces. Only key positions are manned in peacetime. Each reservist knows his precise position in his unit. The system is activated three times in five years both to test the system and update the skills.

In Israel, except for a small cadre, the entire Israeli Defence Forces is a reserve force. It carries out a total of 40 days training every year. It includes a mandatory 31 consecutive days active duty training and 9 inactive duty training days organised into 3 groups of 3 days each. The training is performed in the field under simulated conditions or in augmentation role involving actual patrolling of the frontier with hostile neighbouring states.

In Pakistsn military service is 2 years/selective. Apart from its total armed forces of 4,28,000 it has a reserve force of 5,00,000. Chinese armed forces number 3,100,000 men and it has a regional militia of 5 to 7 million men. Mao wrote in 1945, "This army is powerful because of its division into two parts, the main forces and the regional forces, with the former available for operations in any region, whenever necessary and the latter concentrating on defending their own localities and attacking the enemy there in co-operation with regional militia."

India has 9,56,000 men in the regular armed forces, 50,000 in its territorial army, 1,00,000 men in para-military forces, and 1,50,000 as replacement reserves (assuming approximately 50,000 men retiring every year and they have a reserve liability for 3 years. Our reserves comprise of comparatively older men who have completed 15 to 18 years service in the armed forces. The main role of our Territorial Army is the protection of our lines of communications. We have some para-military forces under the Ministry of Home Affairs. They have different types of organisations. In the event of a conflict, they can only be relied upon to guard the lines of communications and vital installations.

We are a nation of more than 600 million people. Our estimated total manpower of military age (18 to 45 years) is more than 125 millions. It is the duty of every citizen to take up arms, whenever the nation is threatened. Are our citizens capable of doing so ? The energy they waste in fighting against each other and other destructive activities, if channelised properly, can lead us to our goals. Vietnamese,

with their will to fight, have forced a super-power like USA to withdraw from their country.

In USA, it takes 9 to 12 months to convert a raw recruit into an active soldier. Today's weapons and fighting techniques require a considerable amount of individual and collective training. In case of a prolonged war, our Army may be able to convert a civilian into a soldier in six to nine months, by that time a ceasefire may come about and a capable determined aggressor would have achieved whatever he wanted.

India can cut down its recurring defence expenditure or have a larger defence capability with the same expenditure only when it incurs a capital expenditure to attain a credible nuclear capability and have a viable reserve force like that of Bundeswehr and Israeli defence forces.

At present, we cannot compare ourselves with the Federal Republic of Germany or any other Western Nation. Our economy is not as developed, literacy level is low, unemployment is prevalent and industrially we are far behind. But still we can make a modest start in achieving the above goals.

A greater strength of reserve manpower can be achieved by modifying the terms of engagement, i.e., cutting down the active service and increasing the reserve liability. The main problem will be that of resettlement. It will be better if our Central Para Military Forces, and State Armed Police are nationalised and formed like US National Guard. The state of training of this organisation should enable it to take part in active operations alongside the regular armed forces. A percentage of its strength should be manned by the ex-servicemen of the regular armed forces. Key personnel in organisations like Home Guard and Civil Defence should be ex-servicemen. Further, land armies should be formed at state level which should live off the national farms and be self-sustaining after giving a certain percentage to the state granaries. Apart from agriculture, they should undertake other developmental activities and carry out military training. Ex-servicemen who cannot be absorbed elsewhere should be absorbed by these land armies in respective states. The job reservation in Central, State Government and public sector undertakings should not be on the basis of caste but national service. 25 percent of the jobs in Central and state Government services of all types should be reserved for ex-servicemen.

Organisations like Border Roads organisation should come under Ministry of Defence. Organisations like the MES, should be manned by ex-servicemen to the maximum possible extent. Further, the expertise/resources available with the Border roads and MES should be utilised on national developmental projects to augment the defence budget.

It is also recommended that as in the Federal Republic of Germany, resources like heavy construction plant and equipment and transporation available in the civil sector be earmarked to areas in our mobilisation schemes, and exercises for the same should be conducted at suitable periodicity.

The plus two stage in 10 plus 2 plus 3 system of education has enormous military potential. Apart from vocational training, military training could also be imparted to the young men at plus two stage. A civilian's conception of military training is PT, Drill and firing a weapon only, is wrong. Apart from these, military training inculcates a sense of discipline, motivation, patriotism and fosters national integration. After all the Armed Forces are the only organisation in the country where men of all castes and creed work and eat together and are prepared to die for the nation and for each other. The last thirtyone years record of the Indian Armed Forces should be sufficient to dispel the natural distrust of politicians about the Armed Forces. Unlike other emerging democracies, ours is the only nation, where there has been no military rule and never will be. The Armed Forces have kept themselves strictly apart from the country's political life. It is time that our politicians gave more thought to our defence capability, instead of mushrooming police forces which do not significantly contribute to the defence capability of the nation.

## CONCLUSION

Considering the threats and present international environment it will be difficult for India to reduce its standing armed forces. Due to our budgetry constraints, our short term plans for modernisation should aim at achieving at least parity, if not, an edge over our likely adversaries.

Our policy regarding military uses of nuclear and space technology should be revaluated and we should strive for a credible second strike nuclear capability. Nuclear sufficiency ensures national survival, but beyond that level it subserves neither political nor military objectives.

Adequate reserves and well trained Para Military forces also contribute towards deterrence. Our terms of engagement should be revised. Period of active duty should be decreased and reserve liability increased depending on type of job and technical training and aptitude required for the same. Rationalisation of the Para Military forces and state Armed Police should be seriously considered, and they should be formed into an organisation like the US National Guard. Land armies should be formed at state level. They should cultivate the national farms and contribute towards other developmental activities. Care should be taken that these land armies do not become white elephants. They should be self-sustaining and provide certain

percentage of their produce and money from developmental project to National granaries and exchequer. They should be governed by Army Act and should provide sufficient incentives to its members to give their best. Apart from basic military training to all its members, approximately 25 to 30 percent of its members should be sufficiently trained to take part in active operations alongside the regular Army. These personnel should have specific mobilisation assignments to enable them to be effective against an aggressor at short notice. Organisations like the Border Roads Organisation and MES should be used to augment the defence budget.

Only when we achieve nuclear sufficiency and build-up adequate credible reserves, can we risk cutting down our regular armed forces. Games of numbers are very deceptive and limited wars with limited objectives do not mean limited means.

"The probability that we may fail in the struggle, ought not to deter us from the support of a cause, we believe to be just".

—*Abraham Lincoln*

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# A SMALL OR LARGE FORCE*

LIEUT ASHOK KUMAR TULI

## INTRODUTION

India has large frontires on land and sea. A small, selective and even very modern force, however well it may be trained and equipped, would not be in a position to defend these extensive frontiers. This is due to the fact that India is vulnerable to land, sea and air attacks and to cater for these all over the large frontiers it is imperative to have a voluntary system of Armed Forces.

## FRONTIERS

(a) India has land frontiers with six neighbouring states in the Western Sector, the frontier with Pakistan extends from the Arabian Sea into Kashmir (Including Pakistan occupied Kashmir). The border has the following types of terrain :—

(i) Mountainous which includes snow extent mountains in the region of Jammu and Kashmir.

(ii) The plains of Punjab which are divided by a number of rivers and their tributaries.

(iii) Desert terrain in the region of Rajasthan, and

(iv) Swamps and marshy terrain in the Southern most region of Rann of Kutch.

(b) In the North, India has a very long border with China. This border however consists of only one type of terrain-mountains which are in winters snow clad and certain permanent snow bound areas. Within this large area, on the Sino-Indian border are Bhutan and Nepal which have common frontier with both the countries.

(c) The far eastern border of India is with Burma which is mainly comprising of jungle terrain and mountains with numerous swamps and marshes in this area.

(d) Encompassed from three sides by India is Bangladesh. This again has a variety of terrain but mainly it is marshy with numerous rivers and rivulets cutting the area. The terrain in various regions is :—

(i) The area touching Bengal is generally plain and is divided by a number of rivers rivulets and streams.

* This paper submitted for Gold Medal Essay Competition 1978 (open to all officers) was recommended for publication.

(ii) Areas touching Assam and Meghalaya are of a hilly terrain.

(iii) The eastern frontier of Bangladesh is again of marshy nature.

(e) The sea frontier of India extend from the watershed of Bengal along the east coast till Kanyakumari and then along the west coast till Gujrat. This is a very large area and the major route for shipping facilities in India.

History has shown that the invaders in India have generally come through the western land frontiers. Since the earliest invasions into India the route was into the Indo-Gangetic plain. This is now the land frontiers with Pakistan. Earlier the Himalayas was considered a natural barrier for invaders and till recent past no large scale invasion had come into India across this unwieldy frontier even though there are instances of traders and travellers coming over them. But the Chinese aggression in 1962 has proved it otherwise and this is no longer a natural barrier but an unwieldy frontier. The sea frontiers were not used by any invader till the British landed in 1604. Then on these sea shores became a route for landings and aggression against India. This large frontier needs a defence force capable of defending not only these sea frontiers but also the territorial waters.

RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING STATES

*Pakistan.* In the recent past the relations with Pak have been steadily improving. This has been going on since the Indo-Pak war of 1971. The Simla agreement and its aftermath has greatly improved the relations. But simultaneously Pak has been building up it arms and defence potential at quite a fast rate and it has acquired various modern sophisticated equipment from USA, France and other NATO countries. This arms build up in Pak is causing a shift in the balance of power in the sub-continent. There is also a chance of Pak becoming a nuclear power in the near future as Pak is negotiating a deal with France for a nuclear plant in addition to supplies of arms, amn, spares for aircraft and tanks with them. Pakistan has also been trying to get A-7 corsair for their air fleet in addition to the aircraft they already have. Pak has also acquired surface to air and surface to surface missiles.

*China.* It has a very large army which is not very well equipped but the sheer strength is an asset. The army is however fairly well equipped with the conventional arms and they have the capability to sustain very great losses on the battle field. All the equipment they hold is produced indigenously and this will add to their war potential. Air warfare is not very likely but it can not be ruled out. However the air force of China is not very modern but is still capable of providing adequate air support. Naval warfare is not likely between India and

China. The road link between Pakistan and China may be used to provide resources and supplies to each other. Efforts are going on to improve our relations but as yet no concrete step has been taken.

Nepal has cordial relations with India and China. But there is no guarantee of whom it will support in case of an aggression. Bhutan has special treaty relations with India.

Relations with Burma are fairly good but even after efforts by Burma and India it has not been possible to stop infiltration of Naga and Mizo hostiles, who are believed to be Chinese trained, into India. This could also be a route to Chinese infiltration in India.

Bangladesh is having normal relations with India and there is no tension of any kind. But the relations of Bangladesh with Pakistan of the most favoured nation status is a question worth consideration. The defence forces of Bangladesh have no or nearly no war potential but these are slowly being built up by foreign aid.

### Indian Ocean

Indian Ocean which was a free zone till the recent past has now fallen prey to the power politics of USA, USSR and China, each trying to exert their influence by building bases in as many places as possible. There is a line of islands under control of USA and these are formidable Naval and Air Force bases of USAF and US Navy. Russia has obtained facilities in a number of countries and China in a few. Pakistan participated in the CENTO exercise in Indian Ocean a few years ago. The US 7th Fleet is quite often found in the Indian Ocean although there is a lot of hue and cry to keep Indian Ocean free of all this but none of the super powers take notice of this and are trying to improve their hold here. Hence the sea shore of India, now presents a very great frontier. Landings by sea have been successfully tried during World War II at Normandy and in Korea. Therefore, for a very vast sea frontier a large naval fleet is essential.

### The Present Defence Forces

"Victory is still measured by foot." This implies that the army is required to hold ground it has occupied and that too it has to be done by the Infantry. The position of the Indian Army today is fairly adequate, in strength and armament, but it is definately not surplus and there is hardly any scope for reduction.

(a) *Infantry.* There is just enough infantry in the army today to cater for the needs of the defence of all the land frontiers. This infantry is equipped with fairly old equipment. But, the advantage is that except for one or two items, all other requirements are manufactured in India and thus are easily available in plenty to meet the demands of a long drawn out war. It is however worth

noting that even this strength of the Infantry is not enough to cater for invasions on more than one front. Though Indian army has proved its worth on two fronts in the Indo-Pak war of 1971 but the support which was given to the army by the people of Bangladesh is not going to be repeated.

(b) *Armour*. The armour corps in India is based on Vijayanta as the MBT which is indigenous. Armour can be used successfully on the western frontiers with Pakistan. But, the amount of armour with India is not sufficient to launch attacks through a number of points across the DCB defences of Pakistan. The infantry divisions do not have sufficient amount of armour support. The armour formations in India are enough to counter the armour of Pak and even to hold a slight edge over them but not enough to brush aside the Pak armour formations and act as decisive factors for the subsequent battles. There is also a deficiency of light tanks which could be used in the Eastern sector and to an extent in the North as India has earlier used Sherman Tanks in Zojila pass against Pak.

(c) *Artillery*. The various branches of arty are not holding the weapon systems of today. Though modernisation is going on, as yet, it can not be said that the arty is modernised enough. Arty support is imperative in the modern wars to soften up the objective and to gain superiority in terms of fire power. Though enough fire power can be provided and adequate support given to infantry and armour, a further increase is required to gain superiority. The AD Arty is more modernised than the field branch but the quantity of AD arty is too little to provide good and effective AD cover to all areas that warrant air defence protection.

(d) Supporting arms and services in India also need modernisation and increase in their strength as their equipment is also getting very old and in some cases phased out equipment is still held as the replacement has not been received.

The Indian Air Force is also consisting of very old aircraft which are now being phased out. The Canberas and Hunters are now being replaced by the new DSPA which is yet to be procured, Jaguar until time comes, the latest aircraft in IAF are the Mig 21 Fishbed and AF 24 Marut. The latter has not been used operationally as yet. Gnat, another virtually vintage aircraft is doing a very good job here. Relatively, to the air forces of our neighbours, the aircraft of the IAF are nearly on the same standing, but certainly not in a position to achieve absolute air superiority and to shape the land battles as they like. The IAF has been very effective as the guardian of our air space and has also given an adequate close support to the army. The Longewala battle is an example of the support the IAF can provide even with these old aircraft as Hunters which were involved in that mission. But an increased strength and modernisation of IAF will make it a force to reckon with.

The Indian Navy needs the greatest increase in strength. Though all variety of ships are held with the navy but its strength needs an increase. The Navy too has done its job well but with the threats

building up in Indian Ocean the Navy may find itself without adequate resources to meet this threat.

A decrease in the armed forces of today is not very praticable but instead it should stay at its present strength if not increased and should be modernised further.

FINANCE

The defence forces get a very small cut of the annual budget. This budget is capable of sustaining the armed forces, taking care of Defence Production and Research and for limited modernising the armed forces at a fast rate a much greater cut of the budget will be required and this is not practicable due to the fact that our economy is not very strong. It may be said that if the strength of the defence forces is reduced it will be possible to provide the defence forces with highly modernised equipment. This concept is correct in theory but practically it will not only be difficult but it will be too much of burden on our economy. For an instant if we consider that the strength of a the defence forces is reduced to a quarter of its present strength, with this it will be possible to equip the remaining armed forces with highly modernised and very sophisticated equipment But these will have to be imported from some other country with the clause in the deal that this will be subsequently manufactured in India. Even if this is obtained what would be the result ? For years it would be essential to depend on that country for spares, ammunition and may be even for repairs. Now for that period till full scale indigenous production commences the cost of equipping the entire armed forces with this new equipment will be prohibitive in view of our economy. It is however possible to carry out research and develop weapon system and then provide them to the armed forces in small instalments. This would be indigenous even though the design and the technical know how is be imported. A contention may also be there that the defences are unproductive economically and hence can be reduced. Yes, the defence forces are unproductive but it is due to this that the continued progressive development is possible in a country.

Another aspect of the reduction of the strength of the defence forces would be an uncontrolable increase in unemployment. This will be a great strain on the economy as we are already facing a server unemployment crisis in the country. Should this happen then a greater amount of finances would have to be employed to create jobs and hence the defence budget is likely to decrease proportionately to the strength of the defence forces and then where is the money for the modernisation ?

INDUSTRY

The defence production industry is geared to produce the equipment in use today at a rate to be able to sustain a long drawn out war. It is also carrying out research and development of various new systems and weapons that will be required in future. But should a new weapon system be imported that is be required to be manufactured in India even if all the technological know how is available. Thousands of tests and trials of each component will have to be carried out before it can be manufactured. This may lead to the research and development of an indigenous system coming to a grinding halt. The machine and other basic requirements for the manufacture of that weapon system, its electrical and mechanical components, the armament it has, the ammunition it uses and such things will require modification in the existing production material if new equipment is not required to be made. And then how much time will it take to manufacture all this material before the weapon system and all its affiliated items are produced indigenously ? All this time the basic weapon will continue being produced. What happens to that once a more sophisticated weapon is produced ? It will be showed as a reserve or may be exported to some country which is ready to accept it once it has become obsolete here. Till the time that weapon system which is introduced to modernise the army is supplied to all concerned and full scale indigenous production is well under way, dependence of the country from where it is imported will remain. And for long drawn out war it is indigenous manufacture that will be most important. India can not afford to set up new development centres and manufacturing plants for these weapons as the economy does not permit and the basic industries still require a lot of development. This is the case for just one weapon system. If the smaller army, navy and air force is equipped with more modernised equipment thousands of such weapon systems will be required to be developed and neither our industry nor our economy is in a position to do so. Hence a slash in the defence forces is not feasible as these will require to be equipped with more sophisticated equipment at a moments notice and this is not practicable.

A SMALL FORCE

A small, selective, highly trained well equipped modern force is not the answer to the defence requirements of India. No force however well trained can be the answer unless it has sufficient manpower and material. The superiority in terms of fire power and sophistication is important. The highly trained force is most important even if it is small in comparision to a large unwieldy force which is not well trained. But a small force would not be the answer to the problem of defence as it can not meet the requirement of the large frontiers,

The army if reduced in size would have numerous problems which would reduce its effectiveness. Some of the basic problems are :—

(a) The frontiers are far too large to be manned by a smaller army in such a way as to provide adequate defence. Should this be done nearly the entire army will be flung on the borders having no reserves which could be launched in a counter attack.

(b) With most of the army being committed to the front line defences no reserves will be available to back up the OP if any of these forward troops breakthrough the enemy defences.

(c) In keeping the troops on the front line most of the time due to lack of resources it will be difficult to give units a peace tenure alternately or may be even once in three transfers. This will involve the troops being deployed permanently and would lead to a great stress and strain.

(d) In case of limited amount of troops, each unit will have to be proficient in operating in all types of terrain available on the frontiers of the country. Hence the troops will be required to be able to operate very effectively on all the frontiers. This will pose problems in training and maintenance.

(e) In case of a war, since very limited reserve would be available it will be imperative to withdraw forces from some other frontiers and strengthen the defences on the enemy's axis of attack or in that region. Thus gaps will be left in these areas from where these units are withdrawn. In case these gaps are covered by moving in troops from the units around it, the sector will become very weakly defended.

(f) The army would also not be in a position to fight a long drawn out war due to the lack of reserves as replacement of manpower would not be adequate and even at an average casuality rate which would be incurred during an Operation, after about weeks the strength will fall below acceptable limits.

The Air Force is already small enough. It is expected not only to protect the air space of the country but is also required to assist the army and the Navy. With its present strength it can only just perform the duties. But if reduced it will inherit certain drawbacks which will hamper its effectiveness.

(a) It will not be in a position to intercept enemy aircrafts which would enter our air space from a number of places. This would reduce their effectiveness in defending the air space.

(b) In case a number of targets are to be engaged deep within enemy areas with a view to destory the enemy war potential, it may not be possible to carry out air raids at different places simultaneously and that would reduce its lethality.

(c) The recce and strike missions carried out by the Air Force would not be possible.

(d) CAP may not be available to the Army and this could result into enemy air force gaining air superiority.

The coastal frontiers are far too vast to reduce the strength of the navy. It has the responsibility of the costal defence and to be

secured on land we must be supreme at sea. Reducing the strength will render the navy unfit to carry out its task.

(a) It will not be possible to ensure that the costal areas are guarded against enemy naval attacks or even amphibious landings.

(b) Ports, harbours and shipping will be endangered as the navy may not be in a position to cater for multiple attacks launched simultaneously on the prominent ports.

(c) It may not be in a position to intercept and destory enemy ships on the high seas.

(d) It would not be in a position to attack enemy ports as it is likely that ships would not be available for this task after catering for the defence of own areas.

## CONCLUSION

Due to the vastness of Indian land and Sea frontiers and their versatile nature it is not ideal to have a small, selective, highly trained and well equipped modern force as it would not be able to perform its function. A large voluntary force as at present is essential and this force is the answer to the likely threat to our security, and can be well provisioned with fairly modern equipment that is indigenously manufactured.

# GROOMING OF JUNIOR LEADER : THE RIGHT WAY

CAPTAIN R. JAYA KUMAR, EME

## INTRODUCTION

During the course of the last thirty years our country has undergone many changes. Rapid changes in the socio-economic structure, technological advancement, spread of literacy and the climate of welfare state have changed the characteristics of Indian behaviour. A soldier now compares himself with his counter part in civil. He has awareness of rights and privileges as a citizen of India. There is a progressive change in the outlook of the enlisted men in all the three services. They are no more prepared to accept the hierarchical and semi feudalistic officer-man relationship which persists even now to a great extent.

The soldiers who hail from the democratic society are placing complex and challenging demands on military leadership. Men expect more latitude to express their personal view on many matters and even long to take part in the decision making process. The masses have realised their potential and are assertive of their rights and privileges, but a few recognise the responsibilities. They no more accept the official line blindly and they would like to be convinced on the intrinsic merits of the goals and objectives.

There is a general feeling in the army today that the outlook on the man management should change to meet the prevailing situation. There is a need for a change in the leadership styles and application of leadership at all levels and more so in the case of junior leaders. The junior leader is now subjected to varying situations and progressively changing groups.

## AIM AND SCOPE

The aim of this paper is to discuss the validity of the training imparted to the young officers at various academies towards orienting them on the concept of man management and to suggest the qualitative changes considered necessary in their grooming taking into consideration the rapid changes in various fields.

The subject is discussed under the following heads :—

(a) Leadership styles and environments.

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* Cash Winning Gold Medal Essay 1978. (for officers up to the rank of major)

(b) Desired change in the outlook of junior leadership.
(c) Evaluation of present leadership training at the academy.
(d) Grooming of junior leaders : The right way.

## LEADERSHIP STYLES AND ENVIRONMENT

### CONCEPT OF LEADERSHIP

Leadership as a concept and as a tool of professional military management receives more emphasis than any other training in the development of the military leader. The ability to lead men effectively and to employ the individual and collective abilities of a group of men are marks of successful military manager. The military provides structure for leadership. It establishes a multitude of organisational echelon within which people interact and exert varying amounts of leadership on other elements. The structure is organised to accomplish a variety of tasks, responsibility to the leadership of persons strategically placed at all levels. Leadership can occur at every level of the military organisation.

### RANGE OF LEADER STYLE

Leader styles in the army range from autocratic type (also called authoritarian type) to democratic (permissive type). Autocratic type leader uses maximum authority, makes decision without any help and orders people what to do. He is dominant and by controlling tends to set standards and rely heavily on rewards and punishments. The autocratic style produces good short run results. But is apt to over burden the leaders because it is a 'do-it-yourself' style.

The democratic style leader is tolerant, self trusting, very permissive, whose loose control results from depending heavily on reward and recognition with no punishment. This type of leader delegates decision making to his subordinates and uses no authority what so ever. These two extreme types do exist in the army.

But most leaders operate around the middle of the leadership continue by using a variable style ranging from selling decision to asking for group decisions. This style displays the characteristics we might expect, that is, it relies on will to achieve and planned performance, objective creative people, and by inter acting and analysing tends to set standards and rely heavily on rewards and challenges. This very kind of leaders gain excellent results by operating in the variable style category of leadership.

### CHANGE IN OUTLOOK OF MEN

There is a drastic change in the outlook of men serving in the army. India is undergoing a social revolution of a-we some proportions. The army's biggest problems, those which demand the

attention of our senior leaders and their subordinate commanders, are people problems—recruiting and retention, racial tension, discipline, military justice, drug and alchohol abuse, and the professional ethics of officers and non-commissioned officers. For the reason 'Military sociology' might be a more precise overall term. As a result of the prevailing social revolution the men are having a change in their outlook. They are no more prepared to accept hierarchial and semi-feudalistic officer-man relationship which persists even now to a great extent. The QR of men to be recruited have been raised. The men so recruited have sufficient intelligence to reason every task allotted to them. They no more blindly follow the immediate superiors as it was the case in the past.

LEADERSHIP AND THE SITUATION

Leadership always depends on its milieu or environment. While considering the problem of leadership an appreciation of the particular group of people must be studied. Leadership comes into play when there is a problem which is shared. The leader is closely related to the goals and aspirations of the group. The leader is not a leader because he is intelligent, courageous or brilliant, but, rather, because his intelligence, courage and brilliance are a means which can satisfy the needs and aspirations of the people whom he leads.

The leader and those he leads must be bound together and united by common aspirations and ideals. In order to get the maximum workout of the people a leader must share the goals and ideals. Leader is a result of an interaction which takes place between the members of given group.

In the army the prestige of the leader is not derived from an evaluation and acceptance of him by the different elements of the group but he is appointed from outside the group. Thus the person leading his men must be accepted a part of the group, share its concerns and seek to understand the problems of the group he is to lead. He should convince the elements of the group that he has the necessary ability to satisfy the aspirations and ideals of group.

The junior leader, who is filled with dogmas of trait and principles of leadership, is bound to become autocratic because the view of the leader as a symbol-that is the view which sees the leader as a person who possesses extra-ordinary qualities or virtues is separated from the masses. He no longer understands the needs and aspirations of the people he leads.

On the other hand if the leader only satisfies the needs of the group then it might result in demagoguery populism. In order to achieve enlightened leadership, both of the foregoing extremes must be avoided. The leader must continue to have frequent contacts

with environment in order to attempt to satisfy its legitimate ideals and hopes. But at the same time he must be resolved to lead the group to achieve and accomplish the task.

DEDICATION TO PROFESSION

Alongwith many demands which the army makes on a good junior leader imposing heavy responsibilities to lead, to follow, to work well with one's fellows, it expects the junior leader to develop the proficiency of the profession. He must be a man of many accomplishments, an adept at ministering to the needs of his men as he is apt at teaching the professional skills of soldiering. It requires one to be skilled at profession to accomplish the myriad duties. One has to be dedicated to the profession to attain the professional craftmanship. The three good convictions for any junior leader are :

(a) I and I alone am responsible for whatever my men do or fail to do.
(b) Anything I have not inspected, I have neglected.
(c) I am directly concerned for the well-being of my men.

There are those today who tend to take no cognisance of the importance of inspection. They tend to become 'careerist' who want to gain popularity at the cost of profession. They may be of opinion that it is easier to obtain a good efficiency this way.

Todays young soldiers to 'do their own thing' which is possibly suited to civilians whose jobs do not include risk of death as an occupational hazard as in the army. But 'doing one's own thing' do not produce soldiers reliable in the battle field with chance of survival.

DISCIPLINE

Gen. George Patton expressed his view about discipline ; There is only one kind of discipline, perfect discipline. An officer who fails to maintain discipline is a potential murderer.

In battle, discipline is the most important characteristic if soldiers wish to survive and win, Maj Gen. John M Schofield made the following statement about discipline.

"The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an Army. It is possible to impart instructtion and to give commands in such a manner and such a tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to obey. The one mode or the other of

dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to other cannot fail to inspire in them regard for himself, while he who feels and hence manifests, disrespect toward others, especially his inferiors cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself."

## DESIRED CHANGE IN THE OUTLOOK OF JUNIOR LEADER TOWARDS PROFESSION

Firstly, the above statement makes it very clear that discipline is the only thing which separates an army from a mob ; without it, soldiers can very quickly resemble and worse, act like mob. There are three basic methods of obtaining discipline :

(a) By fear.
(b) By appeal to commonsense or patriotism.
(c) By setting an example.

The leader must vary his leadership style in order to choose the correct method of ensuring discipline, among men. Discipline carries inherent reward and punishment. It is a point to note that punishment for disciplinary infractions in the army should be applied as impartially as possible. Otherwise the very purpose of leadership fails.

The Combat discipline can only be ensured by rigorous training during peacetime. The leader should note that mistakes made in training can be corrected but mistakes made on the battle field are paid in terms of human lives. The success on any battle field depends on team work. The three possible ways to obtain team work are ;

(a) Ensuring that men know and can perform their professional skills.

(b) Increasing the soldier's desire to contribute toward the mutual goal.

(c) Making the members of the team credible to each other, cohesive and feel for each other ?

Secondly, the junior leader should know that he is also expected to be a good follower ; you are never in a position in the army where you are not following. Each officer is a product of 'Followership." The junior leader requires intelligent empathy with superiors. The initiative could be used, in absence of order to support the objectives of superior. But it is also essential to disseminate the goals and objective of the higher commanders to subordinates. The other aspect of good followership is obtaining a good, empathic relationship with superiors.

# EVALUATION OF PRESENT LEADERSHIP TRAINING AT THE ACADEMY

## Leadership Training at the Academy

The leadership training at the academies is based on various leadership traits. The fourteen traits-bearing, courage, decisiveness, dependability, endurance, enthusiasm, initiative, judgement, justice, knowledge, loyalty, tact and unselfishness, are impressed as the distinguishing qualities which if demonstrated in daily activities, help the commander to earn the respect, confidence, willing obedience, and loyal co-operation of his men.

The academy presupposes a sizeable number of these qualities to be present in the leaders which would differentiate them from the non-leaders. The following leadership principles are taught to the young officer.

(a) Be technically and tactically proficient.
(b) Know yourself and seek self-improvement.
(c) Know your men and look out for their welfare.
(d) Keep your men informed.
(e) Set an example.
(f) Ensure that the task is understood, supervised, and completed.
(g) Train your men as a team.
(h) Make sound and timely decision.
(j) Develop a sense of responsibility in your subordinates.
(k) Employ your commany in accordance with its capabilities.
(l) Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions.

It is impressed on the young officer that although the applications of these principles vary with situations, a commander who disregards them is risking failure. The various leadership factors which are stressed on the minds of young officers are

(a) Morale
(b) Espirit-de-corps
(c) Discipline
(d) Proficiency

Another point to note is that the young officer is constantly made to obey or follow the senior throughout his training at the academy, He is forced to become a follower and develop this characteristic. By and large they become good followers. But it is left to the young officer to absorb ideas, instruction and concepts ; and through process of discrimination, acceptance and elimination, store away the best of them for future use.

COMPATIBILITY OF ACADEMY TRAINING WITH ENVIRONMENT

Is the offcer training at Academy campatible with the environment to which a newly commissioned officer is subsequently exposed to ? This question calls for a detailed study of the environment out in the unit.

Throughout the training at academy the young officer was drilled with the ideals of leadership principles, leadership traits and success of their application. Once he joins the unit he is exposed to a different environmental conditions. He is watched by men as well as the senior officers. He is now willing to follow the leader, he is in search of a leader who can be his ideal.

He is now exposed to a group of men who are capable of thinking and who are conscious of their own potential. The men are no more prepared to accept the leader blindly. They are assertive of their rights and privileges. Now the question is, can he solve the man-management problems by the application of the traits approach that was preached at his academy. The answer is, he is partially able to succeed.

The men whom he leads are eager to join the decision making process and want to contribute more and more to the aspect of the management.

They want their voices to be heard and their demands met: They compare themselves with the civilian counter part.

Thus we see that there is a need for change in the man-mangement concept. The training imparted at the academy on leadership is failing to serve him as an ideal to solve his man-management problems. He is made to vary his management tactics as per situation and he is forced to have a group discussion in order to achieve complete success.

It is very clear from the above arguments that the leadership training at academy is not compatible with the environment prevailing at the units to which a young officer is exposed. The trait and principle may be used to give a good foundation to the development of man-management.

## GROOMING OF JUNIOR LEADER : THE RIGHT WAY

Whether it is a question of motivating men or the leader, two aspects, namely, Behavioral Science and Human relations have to be considered.

The human relation is the integration of people into a work situation that motivates them to work together productively, co-operatively and with economic, psychological satisfaction. It is action oriented, related to people at work in an organisation.

A Scientific inquiry relating to human behaviour, lead to the following assumptions :—

(a) The expenditure of physical effort in work is as natural as play

or rest. The average human being does not inherently dislike work. Depending upon controllable conditions, work may be a source of satisfaction (and will be voluntarily performed) or a source or punishment (and will be avoided if possible).

(b) "External control and the threat of punishment are not the only means for bringing about effort toward organisational objectives. Man will exercise self direction and self control in the service of objectives to which he is committed."

(c) Commitment to objectives is a function of the rewards associated with their achievement. The most significant of such rewards, e.g., the satisfaction of ego and self-actualisation needs, can be direct product of effort directed towards organisational objectives.

(d) The average human being learns under proper conditions not only to accept but to seek responsibility. Avoidance of responsibility, lack of ambition, and emphasis on security are generally consequences of experience, not inherent human characteristics.

(e) The capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of imagination, ingenuity, and creativity in the solution of organisational problems is widely, not narrowly, distributed in population.

Two major categories of factors affect the motivation of an individual :—

| Dissatisfiers | Satisfiers |
|---|---|
| (i) Boss relationships | (i) Recognition |
| (ii) Working conditions | (ii) Achievement (Sense of) |
| (iii) Unit practices | (iii) Responsibility (Sense of) |
| (Extrinisic to the job) | (Intrinsic to the job) |

The aforesaid factors and assumptions could be interpreted to motivate the young officer as follow :—

(a) **Working conditions :** The officer should be provided with a favourable working place and a reasonable amount of work which is attainable. The conditions should evoke enthusiasm and initiative of the officer. He should be made responsible for accomplishment of such work.

(b) **External control :** The external control on the activities should be a limited one. The officer should not be coerced, controlled, directed, threatened with dire consequences to get him to put forth the effort toward achievement of organisational goals, but guided and provided with an opportunity to carry out the task.

(c) **Senior officer's relationship :** It is obligatory on the part of senior officers to take pride in teaching the skills of the profession and develop close relationship with young officer. It is a moral binding on the part of seniors to mould the young officer and guide

him when he falters. A frequent discussion on the man-management could be held during spare time. The importance of such management must be impresssed upon young officers.

(d) **Recognition:** This is intrinsic to the work situation itself; senior officers should recongnise the achievements of the young officer even if it is small and make him feel important in the organisation. He should be recognised as the middle manager and credit given for any good work.

(e) **Sense of Achievement** : The young officer should be delegated a maximum authority commensurate with his responsibility. He should be allowed to accomplish the task on his own and in an improved manner. Thus allow him to develop the sense of achievement.

(f) The other effective methods of motivating the young officer are to motivate him towards :—

(i) Active encouragement of a planned professional training programme.
(ii) Training inspections and unit exercises.
(iii) Leadership instruction and wise counselling.
(iv) Associating with the problems of men.
(v) Create sense of belonging.
(vi) Participation in the troop games.
(vii) Limited emphasis on leadership trait and principles and more emphasis on leader-situation-group concepts.

They want their voices to be heard and their demands met. They compare themselves with the civilian counter part.

Thus we see that there is a need for change in the man-management concept. The training on leadership imparted at the academy is failing to serve him as a tool to solve his man-management problems. He is made to vary his management tact as per situation and he is forced to have a group discussion in order to achieve complete success.

It is very clear from the above arguments that the leadership training at academy is not compatible with the environment prevailing at the units to which a young officer is exposed to. The trait and principle may be used to give a good foundations to the development of man-management.

It is time now for the authorities in the Army to include the concept of man-management based on leader-situation-group approach to the instructions on the subject of leadership at the various academies.

## CONCLUSION

The concept of leadership, officer-man relationship, and man-management at junior leader level have been examined in the light of the progressively changing socio-economic conditions in our country. Man-management at junior leader level demands

close comradeship and mutual respect between officers and men. There is a need to change the old man-management concept as taught in the academy. A swing should be made towards the leader-situation group approach to improve the leadership at all levels. The leader-situation-group concept teaches that there is no ideal leadership style which can be applied to all the situations. Officer should vary his leadership styles to suit the situation. The situation warrants introduction to such a study at the academy. The young officer is a willing worker and more enthusiastic to dedicate himself to the profession as anybody. An opportunity and orientation towards the concept of man-management would go a long way to mould the young officer more man-management oriented. The responsibilities lies more with the seniors than the juniors for such orientation. Let us hope that juniors contribute to the decision making whereby involvement is envisaged and thus affecting the motivation towards man-management.

A leader must vary his style if he means to be effective.

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# CHINA'S DEFENCE IN THE EIGHTIES

JOHNNY MEHTA

*"A hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the best of the best. The best of the best is to subdue your enemy without having to fight".*

THE genesis of this peculiarly Chinese concept was Mao's experience in his early guerilla struggle against the more numerous and better equipped forces of Chiang Kai Shek. The academic Mao had studied the works of ancient philosopher Sun Tzu who lived about the same time as Philip of Macedon, as well as Clausewitz and the campaigns of Napolean. He also learnt the hard way before evolving his own method of opposing, wearing down and finally defeating a superior foe. The concept of people's war has undergone considerable modification since the heroic Kiangsi campaigns of 1930-33. The Chinese army since has been in existence for more than thirty years and has been at war, somewhere, for most of that time. It is thus the most battle hardened army in the world. Its five major campaigns have been in Tibet, Korea, India, the Russian confrontation in Mongolia and very recently in Vietnam—all on China's borders.

## INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF 80'S

In the international environment of the Eighties, the dominant influeene in Chinese Military policy is likely to be the threat posed by a massive array of Soviet military power on its northern borders and by proxy along southern borders with Vietnam and Laos. The Soviets and their Vietnamese allies are by no means only potential enemies, at least in Chinese eyes. The U S. has been relegated to "Enemy No. 2" for the time being. The old frictions with Japan have not been eliminated by Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded in 1978. These involve issues such as off-shore oil exploration and Taiwan. The Nationalist Republic of Chinese Government on Taiwan continues to offer a political alternative to communism and perhaps even more is a striking economic contrast as well. India harbours a latent resentment over border incursions and humiliation by China in 1962. Pakistan and Afghanistan are areas of potential trouble. This is the security environment which China will find itself in during the eighties. China's influence in international affairs will undoubtedly increase in coming years. China's grand design

formulated by Chou En Lai in 1968 Japan and Western Europe to contain what China regards as an expansionist, aggressive and a "hegemonistic" Soviet Union.

THE P.L.A.—STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Viewed in the light of its international environment of the eighties we find that China's military strategy is in fact basically defensive, even though its forces are numerically huge. "Big tunnels, deep store food grains everywhere, never seek hegemony" said Chairman Mao in 1968—a statement which still encapsulates China's goals. The mobilisation of the population for defence and military self-reliance in peace and war.

The people's liberation army is nearly four million strong. In addition there are tens of millions militia which have access to and can use weapons and are trained in guerrilla warfare. Many millions more are in reserve. The armoured divisions are equipped with T-62 light tanks, some T-60 amphibious tanks and a medium tank, the T-59 which is a copy of the Russian T-54. None of these tanks can compare with anything now used by Western or even some Asian countries. They were out of date when China got them from Russia and the PLA has only been able to copy them without producing any improved versions or successors. Also the P.L.A. has little battlefield experience of using armour and none at all in large scale infantry—tank co-operation. It has to rely on Russian manuals and limited lessons from tactical field exercises.

Much of the heavy artillery is as obsolete as its tanks. The PLA is equipped to fight a conventional war but has few weapons comparable with anything held by potential enemies, and how long the Chinese armaments industry could support the fighting forces in the event of the country becoming engaged in a protracted war, is a matter for conjecture. It is doubtful if it could sustain the burden for very long particularly if its industrial plants come under air attacks.

The PLA's mobility is restricted by lack of transport, both lorried and rail, and there is a chronic shortage of most types of armoured vehicles, particularly infantry carriers.

Three principal characteristics must be kept in mind, in evaluating the potential effectiveness of the Chiness Army namely that.

(i) It is primarily a foot—mobile army.

(ii) Its weapons were designed to fit China's severe technical and financial limitations, not to match the capabilities of a first class enemy.

(iii) Particularly in terms of mechanized warfare against a first class foe, what logistics capabilities there are will decline quickly as the distance between deployed forces and largely immobile civilian logistics base increases,

Furthermore, in terms of geography, China has both great vulnerabilities and great strength. The vulnerability lies principally in the northern region, along the 4500 mile borders with the Soviet Union. China's geographic strength lies principally where it is not needed, along the borders with less likely foes-Vietnam and India.

It is said that generals always prepare for the last war. There may be some truth in the adage in China, where generals are much older than their western counterparts, with experience going back to civil war of thirties. and forties and to the Korean war. The equipment they have to work with, their command and control machinery, their communications all fit into the fifties. In Korea in 1951, the Chinese suffered immense casualties using humanware tactics against UN –firepower. That experience led to their being reequipped with comparable Soviet supplied weapons but training and tactics have hardly changed since then, while the army of the rest of the world particularly that of Soviet Union have moved on. The policy of self-reliance instituted after break with Russia and periodic political turmoil, imposed handicaps that cut off PLA off from modern military thought and weapons designs.

## MILITARY STRATEGY

The strategy adopted in face of these weakness is that of People's War coupled at other extreme with development of nuclear weapons. People's war is designed to take advantage of the vast size of the country and rugged nature of much of it and of huge members not only of PLA but of the militia that backs them. It is a strategy that would give ground, draw an invader in and then drown him in a sea of people. Nuclear attack by the Soviet Union.

## MILITARY RELEVANCE OF 'PEOPLE'S WAR'

But is people's war suitable to contain Russian forces ? The answer is almost certainly not, since any Soviet threat would not be of deep invasion of China but only seizure of parts of it, Sinkiang and Manchuria obviously. Sinkiang is hard to defend being sparsely populated and does not lend itself to people's war tactics there are no people to give support, no sea for, the guerreilla fish to swim in, in Mao's words. Manchuria's importance to China lies in its mineral resources, but to the Soviet Union as a potential buffer zone for her East Siberian cities but is vulnerable to attack from two sides and could be quickly cut into two. A battle here would be dominated by Russian armour and air power. Peoples war has no relevance in such circumstances. The incursion against Vietnam in February, March 1979 followed the same general pattern in that there was a careful build up, an attack against relatively weak border forces and withdra-

wal before the main strength of the Vietnamese army could be brought to bear. This however, was a more complex operation than had been conducted by PLA at anytime in the past. How well, Chinese armour, infantry and artillery worked together is unknown since foreign news coverage on both sides was severely limited.

THE FUTURE

Though the ground forces of PLA are 3,600,000 strong and training and morale are good, yet much of the equipment though rugged and reliable is old and needs replacement. As a part of the "Four Modernizations". (Agriculture, Industry, Science and Military) the PLA is to be continuously upgraded over the last two decades of this century. The high costs of advanced military technology, competing domestic and economic priorities and China's scarcity of capital will probably combine to prevent the ground forces from closing the gap between their capabilities and those of the USSR. Despite the new European defensive weapons purchases, the nation in general and the ground forces in particular will remain vulnerable to air and naval attack in conventional or nuclear modes. However, the PLA's offensive capability and hathality will continuously increase so that the ground forces will remain a strong deterrent against military attack of any sort. That is what the Chinese leadership seems to be counting on in absence of any viable alternative.

THE CHINESE AIR FORCE

China's air arm is the third largest in the world, dwarfing those of its Asian neighbours. Despite its sheer size—4,00,000 men and 4,700 aircraft, the air force of the PLA is largely obsolescent. China embarked in the late sixties on a series of programmes intended to improve her air strength but was faced with the runaway pace of modern military technology. Guided missile have been produced and a number of fighter prototypes flown, but the elusive gap between the Chinese aerospace industry and its rivals East and West continued to grow even more difficult to bridge.

To balance this somewhat gloomy picture it should be pointed out that China has managed to develop a viable aerospace industry in three decades. Chinese industry has overcome insuperable difficulty to provide the airforce with at least one supersonic fighter, the Shenyong MIG-21 which has performed creditably against US phantoms in occasional clashes over the Gulf of Tonkin and the MIG-19 has proved Popular with a buyer—the P.A.F.

Also in production is a twin jet fighter, the FANTANF-9, which is believed to have a high performance and long range capability. In general, however, the Air Force lags far behind those belonging to

industrialised countries and it relies to a great extent on old MIG 19s and a bomber force of medium TU-16s both of which are obsolete.

Chinese industry does not yet produce all the lightweights, heat-resistant metals needed for modern jet engines. Nor has anything original appeared in air frame design. The latest Chinese close-attack aircraft, the twin engined F-9 is closely derived from the MIG-19. Like the Chinese made its engines cannot develop enough thrust with available models, hence the decision to buy the old but promising Spey engine from Britain.

An adequate transport fleet is also lacking. The air arm is basically a short-range force, with most aircraft operating within a radius of 500 to 700 kms. from their bases. China is trying to remedy her aircraft deficiencies in transport field by buying from abroad.

Despite plans to import combat aircraft and the development of new and indigenous designs, the PLA Airforce, needs radical modernisation it is to be able to make a significant contribution to China's defence. Lack of strategic aircraft capability also suggests that it would be difficult to transfer military units from one section of frontier to another in time to deal with an emergency.

The last time the PLA flew against a skilled enemy was in Korea, in early fifties. There is no evidence that any member of the PLA Air Force were allowed to fly against the Americans during the Vietnam war and so actual experience in combat will be confined to a few of the older pilots. Soviet pilots are of course, equally lacking in recent combat experience.

The Chinese Air Force is likely to prove completely ineffective against any concerted air defence, whether western or Soviet equipped. The balance has shifted markedly against the Chinese in the seventies. The Soviet Union's rapid and growing transport fleet and long range of latest combat aircraft gives it a capability for long range air reinforcement that China cannot match. It is unlikely that the Chinese Air Force could successfully protect the PLA from attack and interdiction by Soviet aircraft such as MIG-27 or SW-19.

The shortage of tactical airlift capability could be a stumbling block to effective deployment of the Harrier. China really needs western technology, but lacks the foreign currency to pay for all she would like. She needs advanced aerospace technology. Technical delegations visit Europe at regular intervals and also the U.S.A. In January, 1979 a MIG-23 fighter aircraft, one of the USSR's most modern was reportedly sold by Egypt to China in part payment for about 60 Shenyang F-6 fighters delivered by the latter to Egypt. It would be typical of China to manufacture this aircraft as a model for a new fighter design. The Air Force has no doubt of what it needs in way of aircraft and even Tornado/Mirage strike aircraft must be high

on the shopping list with point defence SAMs, anti-ship, anti-tank missiles. China is determined to close the technological gap and take her place in the world as an advanced and industrialised nation.

THE CHINESE NAVY

The Chinese Navy is a huge force in terms of numbers of vessels but it is currently a coastal defence force, with few blue water "vessels and little offensive capability. It has a vital role in facing the increasing threat from the powerful Soviet Pacific Fleet now enjoying new operating bases in South East Asia. China has no capital ships. In future she is likely to concentrate on developing missile carrying submarines and possibly nuclear powered submarines. But her marine technology is so far behind the other major powers, that it is doubtful if she will ever catch up with them, even should she make the effort.

China is actively seeking to make up for the deficiencies in her equipment particularly in electronics and weapons systems. Her most urgent requirements are for modern SSM and SXM systems that will enable her warships to operate effectively against sophisticated ECM and render them less vulnerable to hostile air attack. China is also at present negotia ing purchase of Western missile armed petrol boats and other warships. In course of next few years the Chinese Navy is, therefore, likely to become an even more powerful force, with greater emphasis on surface vessels such as frigates and destroyers with most of its deficiencies in equipments removed. However, even so it is unlikely that it will be much more than a coastal defence force since the army and the air force are likely to take bulk of money devoted to equipment.

MISSILE FORCES

China seems to have adopted long range ballistic missiles as its future nuclear deterrent. The early CSS-1 seem to have been based on Soviet SS-3 shyster and about 90 of these 600 mile range weapons are depl yed. Deployment of CSS 2 IRBMS has been limited to about 20 rounds and is not expected to increase. The weapon range of 150.. miles has been completely outclassed by 3500 mile range of CSS-3 although the latter has not yet been deployed. The exact status of full range CSSX-4 ICBM is difficult to determine. Latest US Intelligence reports say that the weapon is still an active prospect and unlikely to become operational until two or three years from now. Develo pment of submarine launched guided missile is underway but no oper itional target date for the two stage solid propellout missile is available

The operational history of liquid fuelled missile indicates that all of Chinese IRBMS will get off launched without accident Guidance systems become an increasingly critical matter as size of target and

size of warhead decreases. In a strategic sense China's nuclear has little military value and threatens one or more of Soviet cities in Siberia and there is some remote possibility of a successful ICBM strike against an urban target in European Russia. A Chinese attempt to deliver nuclear weapons by aircrafts could have lower prospects of success. The PLA as it is today is no match for Soviet air power. There is also a lack of ECM devices which would make it impossible to penetrate Soviet air defences. A Chinese decision to use its relatively small nuclear arsenal in what would be essentially a terroristic mode, would invite Russian retaliation of massive propositions against Chinese cities.

THE THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION

The threat of the Russian bear looms large on the Chinese horizon. On the 4000 mile Sino-Soviet border the world's largest armies confront each other. Nearly 43 Russian divisions are stationed on the borders of Sinkiang, Manchuria and other Outer Mongolia. The Far Eastern front absorbs more than one-third of the Soviet military effort; and is certainly no military side show for Moscow. The Asian units receive the latest equipment often before it reaches the Warsaw Pact area. There are some 12000 tanks mostly T-62s and T-55s facing even older models on the Chinese side, the latest artillery and heavily fortified defensive bunkers, which hold tanks sunk into concrete pill boxes particularly concentrated around China and Vladivostock.

Four Soviet military districts, Central Asia, Siberia, Trans Baikal and Far East on compass the entire length of Moscow's spindly line of communication with its Asia provinces. They would form a single theatre of war in the event of hostilities, viewed from China, the military build up can only contain menance for China's future security. The fact however remains that China is not in a position to pose a serious or sustained threat to the Soviet Union. Moreover the Russians have recently nearly doubled their garrison of three divisions in outer Mongolia.

The Chinese can hardly avoid forming the conclusion that Moscow is determined to position sufficient military power on the border, not to conquer China—but to cripple her industrial and military potential for another generation so as to eliminate the danger of a second front being opened by Chinese in event of a conflagration in Western Europe.

The obvious strategic targets for destruction in China are the nuclear missile installation at Lop Nor and Shwang Cheng, and northern Manchuria, the key to China's industrial power.

The inadequacy of China's internal communications means that the Chinese army has to be garrissoned where it expects to fight, supported by millions from the local region militia. Industrial developments are now being situated further south and east.

A Russian thrust into Chinese territory upto the railway line running west from Vladivostock would not only cripple China but would enhance Soviet domination of Korea and Japan and strike at the very foundation of America's defence guarantees to those countries under circumstances when the US watched like an idle spectator during the Soviet take over of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union is, therefore, now in a position to pin down the Chinese and prevent them from making any successful diversion should the former be engaged in hostilities in West Asia or Central Europe. The Chinese with their obsolete weapons and bare offensive capability are desperate to stiffen the US and Western resolve to take some of the Soviet heat off their backs. The convential weapons, the PLA presently has, are those that China can build, not those that are needed and so the policy of self-reliance is being abondoned and foreign military technology being sought while some weapons would be sought to meet immediate needs, re-equipment on any scale would take years to start and a decade to have significant impact. The Soviet forces would naturally not be standing still all this time. The gap would be narrowed but certainly not closed.

The reality facing China is that 43 Soviet Divisions are on its northern border and about the same number of Vietnamese and Taiwanese troops are to the south. Which country surrounded by a million or more well equipped enemies would not look to its defence ?

# THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL ORDER

BRIGADIER Y.A. MANDE

## INTRODUCTION

Functional Anarchy is a saying, which in terms of minimum vocabulary, explains the present state of social order or if you like—disorder. It covers the various facets of social and political life, such as—lack of direction, the self centered style of beaurocrats, indifferent attitude of workers, defiance of authority, violence and lawlessness, passionate pursuit of wealth and corruption, discontent of the poor and utter unconcern for the future by the vast majority. Is the present situation explosive, worse than ever before ? Such a question is indeed difficult to answer. Our society has gone through the worse periods, and in many respects, the life today is better than ever before. Nevertheless, the very fact that we ostracize the present state of affairs is important and merits examination.

We should begin our study with the examination of basic question—what is meant by orderly life ? If someone expects Utopia, he is sadly mistaken. Human nature, being what it is, makes it impossible that only good should prevail on this earth. The Anarchists simply dream, when they propagate that society can function without government, and communists shoot out of the blue when they advocate that state will wither away. We must accept that good and evil, and all that is connected with life, both in terms of spirit and matter, exists on this very earth. However, the human aspiration that good should prevail over the bad is valid. The orderly life therefore implies that whereas we accept the vices in human nature, it is kept in check by preponderance of goodness. The wicked elements are never allowed to foul the life. Plato gave us the most magnificent concept of harmony. Buddha, Aristotle and many others advocate balance. We will continue to debate on what is meant by harmony and balance, but the symptoms of disharmony and imbalance are far too obvious and do not go unnoticed even by an average mind.

The social life needs order. The life force does not tolerate disorder. There are thinkers who fell that life is lived in a state of equilibrium. Occasionally, the equilibrium is disturbed but society generates the requisite force, from within, to restore the balance. To be sure, our society has passed through many ups and downs and despite the gloom of pessimists, we have forged ahead. The fact that we have emerged successfully through many instances of disorder in the past is encouraging and there is no reason why we cannot overcome the present state.

The search for order is on old quest. We take lead from Bergson—the present is continuation of the past and gnaws into future. Throughout our discussion it would be important to bear in mind that man is the product of situation but also, he changes the situation.

## BACKGROUND

### PREHISTORICAL PERIOD

THE anthropologists date our origin to 400 millions years. There is a great voice of pre-historic period of which we know little from history and extant records. This does not mean that we cannot make intelligent picture about human life from the known facts. In those premordial conditions, the poor tiny man was surrounded by nature—red in tooth and claw and the wild beasts ever eager to pounce on him while he was struggling for survival. The social order was dictated and based on brute force. Each group of men and women had their leaders, the choice obviously falling on men with physical strength. Such groups must have combined to fight against the common enemies in their interest for preservation. The privilege of leadership must have been the best women and absolute authority. The poor follower in those groups had little to say; after all he had to survive. The picture is fairly akin to pack of animals, but then, the man had just emerged and in any case, man is fairly like the animals even to this day.

With the passage of years (milleniums would be more apt), the situation changed and so did the social order. Gradually man learned how to light fire, which kept him warm, the wild beasts away and delicacy of cooked meal. In due course, he learned how to make primitive tools, tame the animals and agriculture. He learned how to arrange and repeat sound, and with that came to speech which made communication easy. Consciousness and conscience developed slowly and no longer the old social order based on mere brute force could suffice. He was now on the threshold of historical period; he had only to learn how to write.

With the beginning of historical period, our knowledge about the mankind in general and search for order is more precise. In terms of time, our knowledge is not very old at the most 5000 years compared to billions of years from the time of descent of man. But if the absolute time period is not very old, the situations have changed fast and so have real times.

### RELIGIOUS ORDER

The religious order is based on existence of God and consciousness other than mundane. About existence of God, we can only have mystical experience, but the religions became much more than mere love, reverence and fear of Gods. Gradually the religions encompassed all that was human. Consider following :—

(a) Religions gave us the story of creation and movement of planetary bodies. It gave us the reason for origin of human life and its goal.

(b) We know that social life is not possible without customs, codes and conventions. The religions sanctioned these essential elements of life to suit their tenets and gave us the concepts of morals.

(c) The religions gave us law. It explained the functions of state and subjects in various walks of life.

The societies have lived a long time under the sway of religious order. Take our own case—the religion gave us social order in terms of castes. Manu gave us law. Scriptures spell out duties of *Raja* and *Praja*. The various events in human life, from birth to death are covered by religious rites. Upnishads raise fundamental philosophical problems pertaining to soul and its relation with Supreme Soul. The aim of existence was defined as merger with Supreme Soul and release from the cycle of birth and death. Such social order and life in general were dictated in other parts of the world by other religions.

Power and tyranny are the two sides of the same coin. The religious power became tyrannical, atleast in the west. The society had to generate force to combat the religious oppression, excesses and tyranny. The story goes that Henry VIII, questioned the supremacy of Pope, but that was because he wanted a change in wife which the Pope would not permit. Actually the force was something quite different—it was science and printing press. The sciences came to the fore gradually giving us better explanation for the origin of universe, the movement of planetory bodies, descent of man etc The sciences ridiculed the silly explanations of Church fathers such as Melons have stripes because the God had designed it as a family meal a d life long lectures on the importance of virginity.

Today most of us live in the age of science and technology, though the influence of religion has not entirely petered out. As a matter of fact, some countries, strange as it appears, still live under the predominant influence of religious order. Nevertheless, the science have successfully exploded religious myths and in an indirect manner erroded the influence of religion in the maintenance of social order.

We do not mean that sciences explain everything ; at least not as yet and may be they may never be able to explain all the mysteries surrounding human life and cosmos. Nor do we mean irreverence to God. Also we do not mean dismissal of mystical evidenee as nonsense. The point was best explained by Einstein—the existence of soul or spirit does not help us in the investigation of 'matter'. Today, even an average man understands that religions are inadequate to deal with diverse needs and activities of mankind, and their institutions. Actually, man has never left his destiny entirely in the hands of God. Surely, the man is equally responsible for social order. The political search for order has been as old as religion and we have comprehensive accounts from the time of Plato.

POLITICAL ORDER

It must not be understood that human progress follows and particular sequence or chronological order. History does not admit logical movements, it is criss-cross with diverse activites and one such was political as old as history itself.

We have no intention to dwell at length on history of political order. However, rudimentary examination is a must, since social order is inextricably linked with political order. The governments are, in the ultimate analysis, coercive instrument of the state responsible for the maintenance of law and order. Basically, there are three forms of government-monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.

Democracy is the present form of government, though the traces of monarchy and aristocracy are still visible. For our consideration, we can dispense with monarchy for the simple reason that monarchs are afraid of their own existenee, how can they exercise control on social and political order : Aristocracy is many a philosophers' dream, somehow difficult to bring about. We are thus left with democracy and its role for maintenance of social order.

Communism is a form of democracy, which retains extreme coercive power of monarchy and aristocracy as an interim measure for the achievement of a laudable ideal. Indeed its idealism is great, great enough to shroud aspirations of man, which is not merely economic.

Bertrand Russell felt that democracy is not the last and the best form of government, but it is better than previous ones. Indeed, democracy has many problems, and as a rule these problems are due to people who are incorrigible. On the one hand, we say that the powers of the government should be only regulatory and on the other hand we make most unreasonable demands. Let us take few examples :—

(a) We know that the greatest problem which our country faces is that of population. It is a problem which is cause of many other problems such as poverty, unemployment, law and order. Can we hold the government responsible for population ? Surely, people must stand up to their responsibility.

(b) We blame the government for excessive consumption of alcohol cigarettes, drugs and display of obscenity. Are we sure that these are responsibilities of Government ? Afterall such responsibilities must be shared by educationists, doctors, social workers and religious institutions.

(c) We take one more example, that of law and order. What can the government do if people are in no mood to obey the law ? Unless the laws have social acceptance, the legislative bodies can only make laws as an exercise in futility to be dumped in archives.

Democracy is indeed peoples' government in that people get what they deserve. In the infant democracies, the problem is indeed serious

because people do not understand what democracy stands for, nor do they have tradition or cultural background. Do we need proof ? Look around ! the countries are where they were with their problems, only the governments have changed.

The principles and practice are two different things. As a principle, the best part of democracy is that the government is subject to change and there is no crisis of succession. But, meanwhile the political practice and game must continue. Afterall governments must be accountable and it is the function of opposition to expose and criticize the party in power.

Earlier we had noted that power and tyranny go hand in hand. Proponents of democracy are perfectly right in that power of those in authority must be dilated and restricted to bearest minimum, If it is so, the political power alone cannot be held responsible for social order, there must be something else.

### Social Order

Social order is the responsibility of social institutions. For example, syndicalism is perfectly plausible in their contention that trade unions will control the prices in the best interest of workers and consumers ; the control of government in the economic sphere is not needed. Our society comprises of diverse associations fulfilling diverse needs. Each association can fulfill its limited role in autonomous manner. We must not under estimate the role of universities, bar councils, associations of doctors, youth organisations, religious bodies and so on. Such bodies have a great role to play ; at least that is what democracy expects. The fact that social bodies are not playing their role is lamentable. Perhaps, they are still in their infant stage of development. At any rate, the role of social bodies, as a concept for the maintenance of social order has emerged last.

So much for the historical background of search for order. Obviously, neither brute force, nor religion, nor forms of government and nor social bodies have been able to bring harmony and balance in social order. But the search is on. There are always other factors, which disturb the planned course of events. And it must be so, otherwise the life would be a simple, dull affair.

The cry against disorder remains. Let us examine some of the specific causes which are responsible for disorder in the modern societies.

## CAUSES OF DISORDER IN MODERN SOCIETIES

### The Complex Nature of Society

It will be observed that life has moved from simplicity to the complexity of modern age. Here no single factor operates, such as

brute force, religious, political or social. The world has shrunk, so far as travel and interaction is concerned. Knowledge is increasingly becoming specialized. The ego is suffering a set back, who would claim to know all about the forces which govern social or political order ? Adler was right, all of us suffer from inferiority complex.

### Reconciliation of Ideas

Mentally we live in ideas which belong to the past. Unfortunately this cannot be helped, but the requirement is that we adjust to the present situation. The old terms are confusing ; at least they need revised interpretation. Let us take few terms concerning social order. Independence for most of the countries has lost meaning, what we need to emphasize is inter-dependence : but which national leader would do so ? Freedom and liberty are great words, but will people also listen to Tagore !! Freedom exists only in bondage. Those who want to throw away familial or social bondage will not find freedom anywhere. Freedom is a word which is most commonly misunderstood and exploited by leaders at all levels. Surely, one should not burn buses, loot post offices and destroy essential services in search of freedom. Collective bargaining, strikes and agitations were valid when our ability to determine facts and figures were primitive. The emphasis today should be on partnership for progress. By no means, we are making excessive demand on the people. Unless we reconcile to the changing situation, we are doomed to live in perpetual confrontation and militarism. We agree with sociologists that social structure is built on shared and common interests, but it is the nature of interest which needs reconciliation and revision. The interests must not be short sighted and mutually destructive.

### Lack of Idealism

Our times are marked by absence of idealism. Religions are losing their grip atleast as far as social and political order is concerned. In the political field, communists alone have a strong ideology, but the communist governments possibly cannot exploit intervening period indefinately in the absence of success. There is no reason why the democractic goverments should not pay heed to sane aspects of Marx's teachings. Since democractic governments are becoming wiser, little choice is left open before communists. They must revise. It is not possible to ignore human aspirations.

The situation being what it is, which kind of idealism can we have except 'making money'. But Lakshmi is insatiate, she clouds all other virtues. Indeed, money is root of many evils. We cannot ignore the warning of sociologist—unequitable distribution of money causes social upheavals and disorders.

Einstein was once asked, 'what is the meaning of life ?' Einstein replied, "there is no meaning of life, meaning is what we will give to life." We mock at the religion but we have not discovered any set of values acceptable by the people. In the aimless wandering, the worst offenders are well to do and their college going boys and girls.

The elite are torch bearers of the society. Others follow their example. But elite of our times are indeed a miserable lot. No longer they are select few, men of letters. Their rank is increasingly being swelled by these who have money, rightly despised.

W.B. Yeats wrote, "the best lack all conviction ; while the wicked are full of passionate intensity." His observation is more valid today. Those who call themselves good, what are they doing ? Will elite explain ? The author certainly can ; firstly he has the verbal facility and secondly being the government servant, he certainly knows how to pass the buck. What explanation do I give—"such are the times".

THE PERIOD OF STAGNATION

Our society has passed through many periods of renaissance, reformation and restoration. The progress is marked by periods of spurts and stagnation. We are living in the period of stagnation.

Ninteenth century was full of hope. The social sciences had made new openings full of promise. Early in our century, Einstein had made a break through. Today we are living in the period of scientific impasse. Nothing new is happening ; we are only producing Marks II, III, IV, V and so on, in which only businessmen profit. In the period of stagnation, what else can people do except create problems for each other !

The period of break through is followed by the period of consolidation. Social disorder is inherent in the early years of consolidation.

We need not feel pessimistic regarding the present situation of social disorder. Having gone through the worse, surely we will find a way out. Those who are concerned with social order must not ignore the fundamental ground of social order.

## INEQUALITY AS GROUND FOR SOCIAL ORDER

Inequality is a fact, a truth and the great ground on which our quest for social order should be based. Nothing in nature is equal, be it dead matter, plant, animal or human life. We are endowed with different capabilities and that is a fact irrespective of all explanations.

Suppose for a moment, that all men and women have equal capabilities, the search for order would be altogether on different lines. Perhaps no order would be possible and may be it would not be required. It would be silly to imagine world where everything is equal. The need for order and its possibility exists because of inequality.

Inequality is responsible for gradation, classes, castes, leaders and followers. The problem arises because of bases for gradation.

James Barrie is right when he says that there will always be some who are masters and others as servants, there will always be some who give orders and others who obey. His play 'Admirable Crichton' is interesting. The First Scene open in the house of a typical English Lord with his three daughters and an obedient Butler whose behaviour is admirable in every respect as a household servant. The Second Scene takes place on an unknown island, where the shipwrecked family of the Lord is shown. In such a situation, the Lord and his daughters are no good ; admirable Crichton becomes the Lord because it is he, who knows how to build hut, hunt and make living possible. Gradually the former Lord descends to the role of butler; his daughters learn to live with the situation and the eldest daughter even aquiesing to marry Crichton. The third Scene shows the reversal of roles on the sight of rescue ship. Barrie has indeed scored the point that there will always be some who are leaders and others as followers.

But Berrie has illustrated only one aspect i.e. it is the situation which decides leaders and followers. The selection and placement of right people for the right job is the very problem, Now think ! is'nt this aspect responsible for social disorder.

Right people for the right job is an old cry. The issue is fundamental in the management of human resources and maintenance of social order. We should be fair, but if we are not fair, that also is very human. We should not think that adequate thought has not been given to this problem. Plato was the first philosopher who gave serious thought to this problem. He divides his society into Guardians, Soldiers and Workers. He goes into great details including criteria for selection, and lays down a rigorous course of training for guardians. In our country, we have the system of four fold division into castes. Throughout the medieval period. the kings and Lords managed the society based on their personal courage and bravery of which we still sing ballads and songs. The Capitalism bases gradation on accumulation of wealth. Democracies believe in equality of opportunity but are seldom able to enforce. Communism is certainly not a haven for lazy workers and slogan shouters ; its philosophy is everyone according to his work. Bertrand Rusell, too thinks of the problem and makes a simple two fold division of Governors and Workers for his 'scientific society'. Huxley goes farthest of all ; he divides his society into five classes, trained by deep psychotheraphy while they are still infants. Huxley argues that if only everyone thinks about his job alone, is incapaciated to think about any other thing, is well clothed and fed, periodically intoxicated by Soma—the life would become stable and there would be no cause for social disorder.

Let us not even for a moment think that our present leaders and men at the helm of affairs are not aware of this crucial problem. Indeed it is a genuine problem for which the search must continue.

While we accept inequality, the material things of the world must not be for the best. We have lost sight of this important aspect and hence trouble in the maintenance of social order. We must not ignore the age old wisdom. Here was Plato, who advocated simple living for guardians—what is known as communism of intellectuals. Our Upnishads say, "Take as much as you need, the rest belongs to society." The continuity of Hindu culture is based on the fact that our intellectual class—the rishis, maharishis and Brahmins (Vidwan) have stayed away from power leading an austere life.

If those who are intelligent, competant and in authority want to grab material benefits, certainly they can do so but this can only be at the expense of disillusion in the masses and disorder. Unfortunately this vital aspect is not realised and acted upon. We must change our money-oriented values. Everywhere one finds 'money grabing; in the name of security. How does one explain? The life today is more secure than ever before and such security is the surest path to insecurity and disorder.

## THE FUTURE

When we talk about social order, obviously we are thinking of future. How are we going to bring about social order? Which way will the social order come? There are views and each one is valid. Perhaps some Superman will bring about social order. It is difficult to dismiss the Nietzschean view. Afterall, the history of world is the history of individuals. The humanity is fickle and weak; we talk of ego when we suffer from inferiority complex. We jabber about justice, right and good when such terms defy definition. The Superman will know what is good and right, and above all he will implement his dictates by sheer will to power. The weak humanity will have little choice but to follow his dictates. Such a view is not merely a whimsical expression of an inspired man who later become insane. Those who are considered sane also hold similar views but in different manner.

Christians believe in Second Coming. Hindus rely on Avtar. The Sikhs have wisely closed the chapter of Gurus and Mahammad did not feel any necessity for any other prophet to follow after him.

May be the world will destroy itself and build afresh on the ashes of the old. 'Pralay' is a possibility. Einstein had warned us—if the Third World War is fought with nuclear weapons, the Fourth will be fought with bows and arrows:

Superman, the Second Coming or 'Pralay' are the possibilities if we do not reform ourselves and the disorder continues. But surely, we are capable of reformation and restoration. In the sourse of evolution, the mankind has faced thousands of seemingly unformidable obstacles and yet has been able to overcome them.

The problem of disorder has to be tackled from all angles. In the political field, the parties must not lose sight of morals in their craze for power. In the social sphere, much remains to be done. If we want to limit powers of the government, the social bodies must accept their responsibility. A government divested of power cannot be held responsible for social ills. As already stated, the emergence of social bodies as instruments for the maintenance of social order is comparatively recent and one looks forward to them with great hopes. And finally the individual – his role is indeed important. He is the brick on which society is built. We cannot possibly think of magnificent buildings built on rotten bricks.

In this article, we do not intend to discuss details of political, social or economic programmes for the maintenance of social order. Let us concentrate on one aspect i.e., the role of individuals. We make an attempt to reconcile a controversial term—Individual Ethic.

## INDIVIDUAL ETHIC

Individual ethic is a term which is applicable to our way of life and derives its sanction from the Indian Philosophy. The individual ethic implies that Indians are concerned only with their personal conduct and search for salvation. The combined effect of all teachings such as Sanyas, cycle of births and deaths, Karma, the theory of Guna, the relationship between Atma and Paramatma—all lead to self-centered life. The average Indian has little care for others. The individual ethic, since it does not concern itself with social or public good, is not conducive for social progress. Also it leads to fatalistic view of life.

The charge of individual ethic against Indian Philosophy is an old one. We have no intention to discuss the pros and cons of the argument, because already it has been sufficiently discussed. What we want to examine is the validity of individual ethic in modern societies.

We have already examined the complex nature of modern societies. Our knowledge is specialized and limited. The ego is under the pressure of inferiority complex. We are a confused lot who have lost faith. The picture, we reiterate, is that of modern societies and not of the Indian society. Under such situation, let us ponder—isn't individual ethic the most desirable thing ? Must we meddle into every one else's affair and make situation more confused ?

There is a need to redefine and reconcile the term—individual ethic. Here are some views :—

(a) If individual ethic implies utter unconcern of others, it is bad. If the opposite implies meddling into the affairs of others, it is no good particularly in the modern complex societies. The proper thing would be to follow middle course in which we concentrate

on our work and at the same time share concern and understanding of others. It is taken for granted that modern societies have mechanism to scrutinize every department's work.

(b) We must be satisfied with and enjoy our work. Such a situation is indeed difficult to create and applies particularly to our times. What solution can we offer? We quote Gita—"other's work, however pleasing it may appear, is full of dangers".

(c) We must feel pride in our work. Indian philosophy is not fatalistic. At the level of 'Atma' all of us are equal. "Aham Brahmasmi" and "Atmaneya Brahman" are the loftiest concept for human being.

(d) We must have faith. Having done our best, we should rely on super-natural. There must be a source of inspiration to work despite all odds. The majority of people can find faith only through God.

(e) Who knows what will happen next? Individual Ethic is the path of sanity.

Having reconciled the term—individual ethic, we are now left with the role of individuals who occupy the important position of bricks in the mansion of social order. The role has particular reference to officers and elite.

(a) We must develop ourselves. It follows from our earlier discussion—right men for right jobs. The opportunities will come sometime or the other. The important thing is—are we prepared to shoulder higher responsibilities and face challenges?

(b) We must work despite all odds. Giving up work because of supercession is worse. It only means that ruined men are ruining themselves further. Why foul the atmosphere?

(c) We must practise and propagate birth control. One of the greatest achievement of mankind has been that he has been able to multiply his numbers. He has been able to contain all beasts and has established his supremacy. But today the situation is different. Unless we restrict ourselves, people will have to fight people. Population control is a must for social order.

(d) We must accept social codes, customs and conventions. Rene Discartes, Father of modern western philosophy, felt that till such time he discovers his own philosophy, he must accept social customs and conventions. Most of us will never reach his stature or write philosophy. Non-conformity is a game of intellectuals and that too on the mental plane.

(e) We must learn to lead a happy family life and train our children. Confucius felt that only if we learn to live happily in our families, no other morality is needed. Marcel was of the view, that few in society can be educated, the majority can only be trained. If we cannot produce illumined minds, atleast we can train and that is important.

The elite need not do anything ostensible or out of way. If only they can set example, it is enough.

## CONCLUSION

When we cry about social order, we will do well to bear in mind that maintenance of social order in the modern complex societies is not easy. Life in any case, cannot be lived without social order.

During the course of evolution, we have tried various means to preserve social order, such as brute force, religious discipline, search for forms of government, role of social organisations and associations, and so forth.

Today we live in a complex society. Our needs and inter actions have increased. We have limited and specialised knowledge, and as a rule, lack wisdom. We have no strong ideals which can ensure cohesion amongst people. We lead self centered life. We talk of individualism when we have lost individuality.

Living in the age of stagnation, we must make extraordinary efforts to consolidate. Social order will not be restored unless we rehash political, social and economic order, and that must take time.

Meanwhile, the individuals who are the bricks of society must understand the situation and play their role. If individuals play their role, the social order will improve. Much depends upon the elite as masses follow them.

Finally, let us not be pessimistic. The society has gone through worse periods. The present situation is not as bad as people imagine.

# PARAMILITARY FORCES—AT WHAT COST?

"JOE"

*"Private armies—and for that matter private air forces—are expensive, wasteful and unnecessary"*
*"—F.M. SLIM"*[1]

IT is doubtful if any other country in the world has such a proliferation of para-military forces as we have, both of the Centre and the States[2]" notwithstanding the fact that India is huge and we have borders with five countries (excluding Bhutan), Pakistan, Nepal, Tibet, Burma, Bangladesh—four of which are "alive" and one is "dormant".

The para-military forces (private armies) of the Centre are :—

| | *Name of the Force* | *Ministry* |
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Border Security Force | Home |
| (b) | Assam Rifles | Home (Previously External Affairs) |
| (c) | Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force | Home |
| (d) | Central Reserve Police Force | Home |
| (e) | Railway Protection Force | Railways |
| (f) | Central Industrial Security Force | Home |
| (g) | Special Frontier Force | Cabinet Secretariat |
| (h) | Special Security Bureau | Cabinet Secretariat |

(Defence Security Corps under Ministry of Defence and Naval Costal Guards also under Ministry of Defence are not considered here).'"[3]

It is not necessary to give in detail the roles officially allotted to these forces because the title of each force itself is descriptive and denotes what the role of the particular force is. Briefly stated : BSF is responsible for the border with Pakistan, Burma, and Bangladesh. AR is responsible for the portion of Tibetan border and a portion of Burma border. ITBP is responsible for a portion of Tibetan border only. Apart from these roles, both BSF and AR have and are involved in additional roles of helping Army in counter-insurgency and helping the civil authorities in maintaining law and order. The role of the CRPF is to supplement the State Armed Police as and when required and in addition it also helps Army in counter-insurgency. All this may appear a bit confusing and it is ! Hence this article. The role of CISF is to ensure security of industrial installations of the Centre all

over India. The role of RPF is the security of Railways, again all over India. The official role of SSF and SSB will not be given for reasons of security. Also, strictly speaking, they cannot be termed as para-military as according to Oxford Dictionary the word means "ancillary to or assisting armed forces[4]" and these two forces do not under normal conditions help army. It is only hoped that they will be able to fulfil their role if and when necessary. The emphasis is on the words IF and WHEN, most probably never. From the above, it will be seen that roles of some of the para-military forces—BSF, AR, ITBP, CRPF—are overlapping and also these forces have more than one role to play although their organisation, administration, officer patterning, training, arms, equipment, staff and most important their mental make up may not make them fit for these diverse two or three roles.

Some of the para-military forces (private armies) of the States are :—

(a) Manipur Rifles
(b) Eastern Frontier Rifles
(c) Bihar Military Police
(d) UP Provincial Armed Constabulary (UPPAC)
(e) UP Special Police Force (UPSPF)
(f) Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC)
(g) Malabar Special Armed Police etc.

Apart from these, certain States have got Village Guards/Home Guards/Village Volunteer Force. These private armies of the States have names that are bombastic such as "Rifles" and sometimes misleading such as "Military Police" and some are clothed in Olive green, army colour of uniform. It is surprising why, the Central Government (Ministry of Defence) does not question the propriety of the States to use these army nomenclatures or army type of uniform or army badges of rank and distinguishing signs which only tends to cause confusion in the minds of public and embarrassment to army. As for their reliance, efficiency and impartiality when deployed, it could not be very high considering the innumerable times Army or Central para-military forces have to be called out to help the States to maintain law and order. It seems that the efficiency of these forces has gone down in direct proportion to the rise in their strength. According to Lt. Gen. M.L. Thapan, the increase in Armed Police of the States between 1969-1974 was 27.25 percent,"[5] in merely five years. Another six years have elapsed since these figures were given and at the rapid rate the proliferation takes place, it would be safe to assume that the figures have gone up by another 13 or 15 percent raising the overall figure of increase since 1974 to nearby 40 percent. When, where and how will it end ?

What the States do with their Police is their concern as law and order is a "State" subject but surely the Centre has a right to advise that they do not glorify their Police by giving them military titles, uniforms, badges and accountrements.

To sum up : it is obvious that the roles of BSF, AR, ITBP, CRPF are overlapping. Names of some of the private armies of the States misnomers and their dress likely to confuse the public and embarrass army.

As regards the forces of the Centre.[6] there is a good case for merging some of them. At present the total strength of BSF, AR, ITBPF, CRPF, is about 2,42,000 (BSF 80,000 CRPF 74,000 CISF 39,000 ITBP 14,000 AR 35,000).[7] All these organisations have their own Force HQ, subordinate HQs, training establishments, procurement agencies, legal cells, hospitals, school, ration stores, equipment depots, pay and accounts divisions, engineering services and dozens of ancillary departments necessary to run these different forces. These could all be amalgamated, centralised and pruned. The budget for each of these forces for the year is given below, a total of a staggering sum of just over Rs. 206 crores.[8]

| | *Rupees* | |
|---|---|---|
| BSF | 882388000-00 | These figures are taken from Demand for Grants of Ministry of Home Affairs for 1980-81. It has no security classification.[9] |
| AR | 35231500-00 | |
| CRPF | 664822000-00 | |
| ITBP | 256580000-00 | |
| CISF | 229861000-00 | |
| | 2068882500-00 | |

It will be observed that BSF and CRPF "eat up" half of this huge budget.

Rational distribution of roles would work out thus :

(a) ***BSF, AR and ITBF to be merged.*** Combined Force may be called Frontier Force or Frontier Guards. The role of this Force would be to guard the entire frontier/border—Pakistan, Nepal, Tibet, Burma, Bangladesh (and if necessary Bhutan). One force would have only one role. This force should be modelled on Army lines and all its officers/JCOs/NCOs should be either Army deputationists or ex-Army personnel and rank and file recruited on Army lines. A handful of retired police personnel should be taken for purely police work, such as ; investigation of crimes, presentation of civil cases, manning of finger prints bureaus and some such specialised work. This Force should be a paramilitary force in the true sense and should therefore come under the Ministry of Defence (but not part of Army HQ) and not under the Ministry of Home. It should be dressed like Army. This Force should have territorial affiliations (like AR but on broader basis, not on district basis as in case of AR but on State or States

basis, so that they come to know the country and the people intimately and have intrinsic intelligence value) and should be located on zonal basis. Convenient zones could be ten in number covering our whole frontier/border :

(i) Kutch & Gujrat
(ii) Rajasthan
(iii) Punjab
(iv) Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh
(v) Uttar Pradesh
(vi) Sikkim (& Bhutan ?)
(vii) Arunachal Pradesh
(viii) Nagaland & Manipur
(ix) Mizoram & Tripura
(x) Meghalaya & Bengal

Battalions from one zone should not be moved to another zone lest they lose their territorial affiliations but they can and must be rotated within a zone so that they do not stagnate and become stale. The Frontier Force or Frontier Guards should be headed by an officer of the rank of a Lieutenant General since the total strength of this Force would be just over one lakh. This Lieutenant General should not be designated as Director General but as Commandant General because he will have command responsibilities and not merely direct the activities of his units as is being done by the Director General of Assam Rifles who has no operational responsibility.[10] The whole frontier/border should be divided into zones/sectors/circles. A zone should be commanded by a Major General to be designated as Deputy Commandant General : a sector by a Brigadier to be designated as Assistant Commandant General ; a circle by a Colonel, to be designated a Circle Commandant. The boundaries of zones/sectors/circles should roughly coincide with the boundaries of Army Commands/ Corps/Divisions.

(b) *CRPF and CISF to be merged.* This force may be called Internal Security Force (ISF). Its role should be to help States in Internal Security Duties as well as to guard Central Government/ Autonomous Installations and Vulnerable Areas/Points. This Force should be modelled on police lines and should have all its officers/NCOs/man-power from the police or from open market on direct recruitment. Only a few technical and specialist officers/ JC s/NCOs (such as AIAs and ATOs) should be taken from Army on retirement and not as deputationists. This force should be a simple Armed Police Force of the Centre and not a paramilitary force. Since its role is to help in maintaining law and order, it should remain under the Ministry of Home. It should be dressed like police.

(c) *Railway Protection Force.* It should remain as it is, to look after the security of railways which traverse the length and breadth of the country and whose depots and installation are practically all over India. It should remain under the Ministry of Railways. It should be dressed like police.

(d) *Special Frontier Force and Special Service Bureau.* They have, as their name implies, special roles to play and besides strictly speaking they are not paramilitary forces. These special forces should remain, as heretofore, under the Cabinet Secretariat, till they outlive their utility.

The foregoing are some suggestions to "tidy up" the paramilitary forces. In the process, both of Army and Police, much "brass" will be melted, many "empires" will disappear but all for the good of the country. Neither vested interests nor parochial tendencies, neither personal ambitions nor private jealousies, neither prestige issues nor putrid politics should stand in the way. If this is done it should result in a rational distribution of various forces under various ministries, a logical division of duties and an appreciable reduction in costs. Perhaps than : Utility will be doubled, expenses will be halved, efficiency will be multiplied and duties will be equally divided. Defence will have its own force to guard the entire frontier/border in conjunction with Army which is a truly paramilitary duty. Home will have a force, purely police in character to tackle law and order problems. Railways will have its own force for their peculiar watch and ward duties. The Cabinet will have special force to carry out any special roles.

This article is ended with its title, which asks a pertinent question : "Paramilitary Forces—At What Cost" ?[11]

## REFERENCES


1. F.M. Slim : Defeat into Victory.
2. Since Independence : 1947
3. DSC or to be more correct Ministry of Defence Security Corps designated as such on 23 April 1948. It is commanded at present by a Brigadier and is rightly under Ministry of Defence. Naval Coast Guard was raised in 1979 and is commanded by a Vice Admiral. This also is correctly placed under Ministry of Defence. Hence both these organizations are not considered in this article.
4. Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary gives the definition of the word "paramilitary" as : On military lines and intended to supplement the strictly military.
5. M.N. Thapan ; Men in Uniform : The Statesman of 25 August 1979.
6. Lt. Gen. Chibber in USI Papers Number Four : Paramilitary Forces, includes Border Road Organization and Land Army in Karnataka. I would like to disagree with him. These two forces are, in my opinion, not paramilitary, either in theory or in practice. The former was raised in 1960 and is under the Ministry of Shipping and Transport. Hardly 5% of its personnel are armed. Its tasks is, as the name of the Force implies, to construct roads in border areas where local PWD or CPWD is unable to construct due to various reasons. These roads are not necessarily all strategic roads but are built to "Open up" the country, push in civil administration, step up economic development, provide some work to the locals etc. It indirectly may also help the Defence forces but that is incidental. The latter which came into existence in 1971 is not an "Army" in the remotest sense and they carry no arms. Their task can be summed up as : Grow more food.

7. These figures are taken from various news papers. Observe the staggering growth : CRPF originally CRP (Crown Representative's. Police) had a strength of only 870 in 1947. Prior to Independence CISF was raised in 1969/70 with a strength of 6062 only. AR 1950 had a strength of 5000 only.

8. Are we a rich country ?

9. Budget Estimate for 1980-81.
Detailed Demands for Grants of Ministry of Home Affairs 1980-1981.

10. To employ a Lt Gen without any command responsibilities is to waste his knowledge, experience, talents and of course tax-payer's money ! Is it also not an affront to the rank ?

11. The word "cost" is used in a broad sense, It is not only the cost in money that matters, What about cost in time. effort. efficiency and man power ?

# LESSONS FROM ENTEBBE-TYPE COMMANDO OPERATIONS

COLONEL S. MOHINDRA

THE US rescue debacle in the Iranian desert has again focussed the attention of the military mind on the importance of commando raids. Such raids are lightening surgical operations and should incorporate built-in fail-safe features. Contingencies should be foreseen and planning carried out to the minutest detail. For the US Armed Forces, still smarting from their Vietnam defeat, this operation would have been a much needed shot in the arm. It would have restored their morale. In fact, the effect was the opposite and journalists have referred to it as "a failure of the American nerve".

For the military analyst each raid has more in common than is generally obvious. Lessons are there for all to learn, provided the man in uniform is eager. Their applicability in future situations is contingent upon the manner in which the lessons are exploited. It is for this reason that most countries keep the details of the missions secret. In fact the methods employed by the British SAS Regiment are always shrouded in secrecy.

The past decade has seen six major rescue attempts. All were risky and yet, a factor of commonality is that, the ones which were successes took place in isolated areas and were total surprises. This one single factor contributed out of all proportion and enabled the attackers to quickly over power their foes. The military plan from the aspect of movement and deployment of the force was also simple. The Americans seemed to have forgotten the principle of simplicity in formulating their plan.

There is always a a legendary aura about commando missions. Regrettably the hijack syndrome tends to cloud meaningful perceptions from these military operations. For the professional school these raids are brief interludes which reiterate the prescription of thorough training and detailed planning necessary to precede the main operation. For this analysis I have selected two raids which were such resounding successes that for a while the world found it difficult to believe them. These are the Entebbe raid and the Second World War German Commando Operation at Gran Sasso (Italy) planned by the daring Capt Skorzeny to rescue Mussolini. Since the Iraeli mission is recent a detailed narrative is not necessary and will only be mentioned to draw perceptive parallels.

THE RAIDS IN THE LAST DECADE

A brief account of the commando raids in the last decade is necessary to focuss the mind of the reader to the diverse application of the versatile Commando. In Nov. 1970 one hundred crack US Commandos helicoptered to the Son Tay Prison Camp near Hanoi to free 70 US prisoners of war thought to be held captive there. As a military operation it was a success but the PWs had been moved to a different location weeks earlier.

In May 1975 the small US merchant ship Mayaguez was seized by a Cambodian gun-boat. The US President ordered a military rescue and 1100 marines were pressed into action. All the 39 Mayag-uez crewmen were freed but at a very heavy cost to the leathernecks of whom 41 were killed and 50 wounded.

In July 76 was the famous Entebbe raid, which is the central subject of this article. In Oct. 77 a handful of terrorists hijacked a Lufthansa jet with 80 persons and landed at Mogadishu, Somalia. West German Commandos in a swift operation stormed the plane and rescued the hostages. Three of the terrorists were killed.

In May 80 was the unfortunate US attempt to extricate 53 hostages which ended in disaster. The force consisted of Commandos, considered by experts too small for the mission. The operation left an elaborate tell-tale on the powdery sands of Dasht-e-Kavir, Iran's Great Salt Desert by way of burned out C-130 Hercules aircraft and a Navy Sea Stallian helicopter and four other undamaged helicopters. Inside the burnt out copper were the burned bodies of 8 American crewmen.

The recent British SAS Regiment Commando mission in London in the Iranian Embassy is still the envy of other similar crack organisations all over the world.

THE TWO SCENARIOS OF GRAN SASSO AND ENTEBBE

Gran Sasso is a peak in Eastern-Central Italy. It was here in a hotal resort at the foot of this virtually impregnable mountain that Benito Mussolini was liberated from his captors and delivered to safety in Germany. A small force of determined parachutists led by the famed Captain Otto Skorzeny dramatically rescued the Duce, Friend and foe alike applauded the bold and daring mission.

At Entebbe, in the heart of Africa, just hours before the deadline, Israeli commandos in Hercules aircraft raced over 2500 miles and rescued 103 hostages. Even the Ugandans praised the operation. Elsewhere the effect of this melodramatic mission was enormous. This was Operation Thunderbolt and it hit the captors as a bolt from the blue.

GRAN SASSO

1943. The collapse of the Axis Powers in Africa and Sicily completed the series of military defeats that shattered the morale of the Italians. The Duce, Mussolini, was unable to stem the tide against him and in July he was deposed by Marshal Badaglio and placed in protective custody. His friend Hitler, however, reacted violently and in this event foresaw the shadow of impending reverses. He was determined to rescue Mussolini. He personally selected skorzeny, a commando parachutist for this dangerous mission.

PREPARATION

The Germans selected for the mission were all commando parachutists. They had been thoroughly trained as infantry, engineers and had a working knowledge of demolitions, weapons, vehicles and customs of the enemy. After training, the Unit was yet untried in operations and on the leash waiting for action.

Capt Skorzeny got down to plan his raid in the minutest detail. Being an unusual mission without precedent he had to plan it entirely himself. In order to achieve his aim, Mussolini had first to be located. There were various rumours afloat of his abduction, suicide, confinement in a sanitorium and so on. Three frustrating weeks were spent with no trace of where Badaglio had locked up the former Head of State. Official sources were close mouthed and even secret organisations could not locate him.

Finally Mussolini was located in the port of La Spezia. Before plans could be prepared he was transferred to the naval fortress of Santa-Maddalena. Immediate plans for a sea-air-land raid were made but before its execution he was again moved ; this time to Gran Sasso. Accurate maps of this area were not available. Reconnaissance would arouse suspicions. Photos revealed a massive building about 6000 ft above sea-level on a wild jagged plateau on the Compo Imperatore Mountain chain. Behind the Hotel was a gentle meadow roughly triangular in shape. The only communication with a valley floor was an alpine funicular railway. A truly impregnable situation.

THE PLAN

The Commando leader carried out his appreciation of the situation and came to the conclusion that a land attack would be costly in casualties and allow the captors sufficient time for any undesirable reaction. A para jump was ruled out due to the terrain. A glider-borne attack was also not very feasible but as it was the only alternative which offered a fair chance of success, it was accepted. The Plan called for a Battalion to move by vehicles to the vicinity of Aquila on the night of D minus 1/D Day and attack the next morning concurrently with the glider attack. The battalion was to seize the landing

field at Aquila and the base station of the railway. The airborne force of 12 gliders carrying a total of 100 commandos was to crash land in the field in the rear of the Hotel and storm the building to capture the Duce.

After the successful accomplishment of this Phase the force was to radio for 3 aircraft to meet them at Aquila and transport them to safety. In the event of a quicker reaction from the Italian Army, Skorzeny ordered a light aircraft to be prepared to evacuate Mussolini from either the Hotel or the airfield. The Italian garrison at the Hotel was estimated to be about 250 men and hence speed and surprise were vital for success. To confuse the defenders he persuaded an Italian General officer to accompany the force. This was a decoy.

THE PLAN IN ACTION

H Hour was 1300 hours on Sunday 12 Sep. The commando were in high spirits. Since the glider pilots were unfamiliar with the terrain the officer who had made the initial reconnaissance flight with Capt Skorzeny was to be seated in the first glider. At 1230 hours the airfield was attacked by Allied bombers. The gliders miraculously escaped but the runway was partially cratered. On take-off 2 gliders got damaged and reduced the force to 90 men. When the commandos had risen to 12000 feet they discovered to their horror that the leading 2 gliders were nowhere to be seen. They had got lost and with them the Navigator. Capt Skorzeny immediately took the lead and navigated the force to the Hotel and began to land.

He landed about 25 yards from the Hotel wall and dashed forward shouting "hands up." He was closely followed by the Italian General and the commandos. In the meantime the other gliders arrived and they rushed forward to their assigned tasks. One of the gliders, while landing, got caught in a gust of wind and crashed into a rocky mountain face.

At this time Mussolini and his escorts were on the second floor of the Hotel and were standing and watching this operation. It is on record that because of the presence of the Italian General his escorts did not open fire. Skorzeny rushed forward and within 4 minutes the Duce was in German hands. The garrison was completely surprised and surrendered. They were quickly disarmed. In the meantime the battalion had carried out its mission and secured the railway as well.

Unfortunately the radio operator was unable to contact the base for the 3 aircraft and so Skorzeny resorted to his contingency plan. He flew out with Mussolini in a light aircraft. The mission was successfully accomplished.

THE ENTEBBE RAID

This has been described as "the farthest in range, shortest in time

and the boldest in imagination." In formulating the mission, the planners had myriad problems including the confirmation, of the location of the hostages and the security arrangements of the Terminal building. During the period preceding the raid this aspect was extremely frustrating as the passengers could have been moved elsewhere. It will be recalled that the US heliborne attempt to rescue prisoners from Hanoi failed precisely for this reason.

It is well known that the administrative and movement problems were enormous. The same are not being mentioned here.

The Israelis also had contingency plans which included additional rescue measures in case the Thunderbolt Force was itself trapped in Entebbe. For this special air support was held in reserve. This support was also available in case any of the aircraft were damaged during the operation.

In order to confuse and deceive the local security guards the leading C-130 aircraft carried a black Mercedes similar to that of the Ugandan President. This car also carried 9 commandos with faces blackened and dressed and armed as Ugandans. Earlier the Israelis also had plans to bring a dummy president to complete the picture. This, however, was not done.

To ensure a safe get-away a special Air Service detachment was detailed to destroy the Ugandan MIGS and another element (Force 629) was detailed to neutralize any hostile Ugandans.

No account would be complete without a parallel about leadership. Here also the commando leader Brigadier Don Shomron was the dynamic force of the mission. He was first on the ground at Entebbe and his aircraft was last off.

This has rightly been called the most triumphant mission of all times. Brigadier General Don Shomron briefed his men on the night before the raid using 3 key words "secrecy, speed and surprise" and Thunderbolt was just that.

## Analysis

Systematic analysis will reveal that for the professional fighting man there are valuable lessons, both tactical and strategical, which can be learnt from these operations.

## Tactical Lessons

Conceptually a commando operation must be original and bold based on surprise and flexibility. Surprise must be accentuated by ruses to confuse and confound the enemy. Having gained the initiative the plan must be carried through with lightning speed so that the defenders remain paralyzed with indecision.

It should never be imagined that the original plan will go through as conceived. Hence detailed contingency plans must be made for every possible enemy reaction. But at the same time the plan should be simple as a surgical operation.

The standard of training should be extremely high. Junior leadership should be such that teams are able to operate independently and take necessary decisions within the overall concept.

Planning has to be based on thorough intelligence. This is particularly vital as failure can have far reaching repercussions both politically and from the morale point of view. At Entebbe the hostages were only split seconds away from total massacre if the mission had failed. As mentioned earlier the US rescue attempt at Hanoi failed because the location of the prisoners was not confirmed.

The operation must be launched in complete secrecy. Plans should include measures for deception and conscious efforts to frustrate enemy intelligence.

STRATEGIC LESSONS

Commando raids may be ordered for a variety of reasons such as the operations of the Allies at Saint Nazaire, Dunkerque and Rommel's Headquarters. The Israeli raid to capture the SAM from across the Suez is yet another instance.

Dividends obtainable from such missions generally outweigh the possible losses or casualties. Successful raids boost morale while at the same time considerably lowering the morale of the defender. This tide should be exploited by carefully planned propaganda.

Along battle fronts which are characterized by extended frontages such raids have an enormous potential. The enemy will be aware and conscious of the adversary's prowess in this field and will have to divert substantial forces to meet this threat. Planned leaks in this direction can frustrate and tire him. He can be made to believe that there are plans to abduct his leaders, raid his headquarters and other places of importance and thereby cause further confusion.

Under certain circumstances such operations can change the course of history. It has often been debated that if the British had been able to seize Marshal Petain during the crucial deliberations for the future of France in 1940, the events in Europe might have been different. Similarly, if the Germans could have raided the Kremlin and killed Stalin the war may have ended differently.

## CONCLUSION

This technique has been made more potent by the integration of the helicopter with commando units. There are now greater threats of infiltration and vertical envelopment in a conventional war. On a nuclear battlefield where smaller combat units will be dispersed over large areas this effectiveness of commandos will be enhanced. Swift hard hitting raids can virtually paralyze the enemy and shatter his morale.

Finally, it should be remembered that the bolder the plan the more spectacular the results.

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# DO WE KNOW THE STATE OF OUR SMALL ARMS ?

COLONEL A.J. BRAGANZA BSC PtoC (RETD.)

*"When the good man mends his armour and trims his helmet plume..."*

*Lays of ancient Rome*
*—T.B. Macaulay*

AS it was in days of yore and as it is stlll done during the lull in battle or after it, all armies take stock of their losses : in terms of equipment completely destroyed which requires replenishment and that requiring major and minor repairs to make them fit for use again. In all these exercises, the watchward has always been economy and in a country like ours, economy of this kind takes on a more profound meaning. India since independence has had to defend herself against Pakistan three times and China once—it is, therefore, imperative that we take a second look at our Armaments after these battles. This article deals only with a 'second look' from the Small Arms aspect, and suggests methods of tacking their replenishment and repair systematically with the accent on economy. These lessons may equally well be applied advantageously to other equipment with slight modifications.

## HISTORICAL

In 1953, reports from the forward troops in Kashmir confirmed that repairs carried out to small arms, especially light machine guns in the field were both unreliable and uneconomical e.g.. a light machine gun sent back to workshop for repair, on return to its unit was found to function for 200 rounds or there about and then stop. Such reports were many and caused a great deal of worry both to General Staff and the technical authorities. Finally, after a careful analysis a solution was put forward by the technical authorities. In short, it was this : the LMG then in the Service, i.e. the Bren was introduced for use in the Army in 1939 at the start of World War II and all the stocks obtaining in India could be considered suspect in serviceability in so far as no record was held or was available to indicate the number of rounds fired by any one of them or the precise technical condition of the weapons in the hands of the troops. No one knew how, where or to

what extent the weapons had been used, whether they were brand new or fired that many rounds putting them on the verge of reaching the end of their life or whether they had been repaired already. As a matter of fact, having been completely dependent for the technical maintenance of small arms on the UK even in 1947, there was no basic tehnical cinformation on which an analysis could be made on the LMGs. Except for the knowledge of small arms possessed by a few officers who had successfully completed the first technical staff course at the then CSD(A), Kirkee, no personnel were available who understood the technicalities of the Bren. A study of the weapon was, therefore, a prime necessity. This was undertaken at the then DTD Headquarters, New Delhi and far reaching technical decisions were arrived at. The decisions taken were :—

(a) That the repairs being carried out to Bren guns in the field, which had been suggested by few over-zealous technical officers, who never understood the design of the weapon, were in the main technically contradictory to the design principles of the gun and instead of sorting out the problem, they only exacerbated it.

(b) That all the guns in the Service. required to be assessed in terms of actual condition by means of a survey, by the Technical Authority so that Army Headquarters could be made wise as to the "real assets" available to them, on which they could plan production and procurement.

(c) That as a result of the survey, it would be advisable and more than possible and most desirable to "standardise" on the LMG in the Service, considering that there were about 5 different marks of the weapon in the hands of the troops.

The job was undertaken against much initial resistance and protest and brought to a successful conclusion after about six years. On the credit side of the survey, it was found possible :

(a) to make available adequate spares for supply to the EME for maintenance of whichever shortage they complained of.

(b) To build up an adequate number of drill purpose guns, which relieved the wear on serviceable guns used by limits for training and duty purposes, for which serviceable guns were being used and so made to suffer unnecessary wear.

(c) to decide on a standard gun, firm orders for which could be placed on the Ordnance Factories.

(d) to provide a reliable gun which the soldier could trust, thus assuring his faith in the weapons he would use.

The most remarkable advantage of the survey was the opportunity afforded the technical authorities to familiarise themselves with the design features of the gun. The actual study and practice of handling the gun in large quantities cultivated in them knowledge and confidence

to tackle any technical problems in the LMG field which were previously referred and only known to the UK. As a matter of fact, the mass survey carried out appeared to be the first attempted, and carried out by a Commonwealth country. It also afforded the means of imparting technical understanding and training in writing technical reports on the weapon to a great many new technical recruits in the shortest possible time. This advantage was also made further use of by dissemination of the knowledge/expertise to the EME.

This survey took place when the Indian Army was of a strength of about three and a half lakhs. Since then, however, we have grown to much larger strength and are now manufacturing apart from this particular gun, most of the automatic/semi-automatic weapons used in the Service within the country. However, with re-equipping of the Army with a self-loading rifle, apart from the new light machine guns, the problem presents many more complications and requires a greater degree of foresight in organisation and planning than before. This paper endeavours to suggest a method by which the problem should be tackled. The aim of this paper is to suggest a method of survey of small arms to ensure :

(a) that the Service is, at all times, equipped with reliable and faultless functioning small arms ;

(b) that the weapon in the hands of the troops at all times ensures this confidence ;

(c) that the utmost economy is exercised in the use of small arms as a result of a survey ;

(d) that AHQ knows at all times the exact state of the small arms in the Service.

## Background

As all of us are aware, the semi automatic/automatic weapons in the Service today are divided into the following groups :

(a) Pistols
(b) Carbines
(c) Self-loading rifles
(d) Light machine guns
(e) Heavy machine guns

These weapons (with some exceptions of course depending on their vintage) have seen service in 1947, 1962, 1965 and 1971, in terrain varying from desert to monsoon and mountains to plains. Neither has there been any record kept of the number of rounds fired through them, on which the life of the weapon is based nor the number of times they have been repaired ; nor is there any possibility of their histories being ascertained. It is, however, interesting to record that it was suggested in 1953 that a log book be maintained for each LMG in the

hands of the Infantry wherein the number of rounds fixed through the gun (each barrel separately) would be recorded. Even though this suggestion was stoutly rejected by General Staff and the Infantry Directorate at Army Headquarters, it was amazing to find that in quite a number of Infantry units this 'much abhorred' practice was admirably (:) maintained. Of course, the maintenance of such records is not a rule and just cannot be expected to be maintained, however keen a Commanding Officer is, once the battle has been joined. It is, therefore, any one's guess as to just what the condition of a weapon is after the battle. Hence it is necessary that a survey of automatic and semi-automatic weapons be carried out immediately after a battle (as is convenient) of the Units involved, or of the total holdings, should it be a total war involving, the whole of the country. We have fought Pakistan in 1947, 1965 and 1971 and China in 1962 and by and large, it therefore seems that a survey is now most desirable to take a stock of our weapons and re-equip ourselves and if this can be combined with the important aspect of standardisation the better will it be for the efficiency of the army.

## PART 2

### METHOD

To ensure that the survey is carried out with minimum delay, the following analysis is required to be made. This analysis which most staff officers are familiar with and will recognise is always available and should encompass each class of small arms suggested earlier. Let us take a hypothetical case :

STOCK POSITION e.g. RIFLES

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Liabilities* | | | |
| UE | X | say | 5,000 |
| WWR | Y | | 500 |
| Other requirements | Z | | 1,500 |
| | | Total (X+Y+Z) | 7,000 |
| *Assets* | | | |
| With Units | A | | 4,600 |
| Other stock | B | | 230 |
| Repairable stock | C | | 300 |
| New manufacture dues in | D | | 3,700 |
| | | Total (A+B+C+D) | 8,830 |

*Analysis*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Liabilities (X+Y+Z) | =P | 7,000 |
| Assets (A+B) | =Q | 4,830 |
| Deficiency (P+Q) | =R | 2,170 |
| By manufacture (by D) | =D | 370 |
| Actual deficiency | =R−D | 1,800 |

ACTION

Once the figures above been worked out, we can then go to the next stage, which is the organisation of the survey or review.

The survey or review of the weapons requires action at many control points, and the objective of the survey is to ensure that the weapons in the hands of the frontline soldiers are returned through EME and Ordinance channels and simultaneously replaced by surveyed or new weapons, smoothly and without the chance of any frontline soldier being without a weapon during the operation. This whole exercise as has been stated, has been carried out successfully in the past and must be ensured in the future. The survey for this reason will have to be a phased one. The phasing of this depends on the decisions as to whether :

(i) It should be done 'enmasse'

(ii) It should be effected unitwise, the frontline soldier i.e. in direct confrontation on the borders being dealt with first and proceeding backwards down the line.

The phasing of the replacement of the weapons will depend on the following factors :

(i) Availability of weapon Ex-new production ;

(ii) % recovery possible from factory through repair guns held in Ordnance Depots by repair from Ordnance factories :

If the rate of production in Ordnance Factories is (for example let us take Rifles) 3,000 units per month, then the front line soldiers' weapons can be replaced at the rate of this figure. Apart from this the number of weapons recovered from the Ordnance Depots will also contribute to the speed in replacement.

The speed in replacement will depend on two factors :

(a) Number of weapons of new manufacture per month

(b) Number of weapons repaired by factory per month.

The repair of Small Arms as in (b) can be effectively undertaken by EME Workshop also, but it is imperative however, that before the EME take it on, they undergo a thorough training at the AHSP, so that

the repair standard either at the Factory or EME Workshop is of the same quality. This action is also suggested as it will contribute to the dissemination of technicalities of Small Arms repair, which so far has been confined to the AHSP.[1]

Should, the decision be agreed on to permit the EME to handle the complete operation, this idea would be very worthwhile considering, as it would leave the ordnance factories with their hands free to concentrate on production for which they are the only sources available in the country.

The main factor involved in the reclamation/recovery of the weapon through the medium of survey is the axiom "If the body of a gun exists i.e. is serviceable a weapon exists."

Stripping and assembly of an automatic/semi-automatic weapon by trainees contributes to wear and breakage of parts by virtue of heavy-handed treatment.

This is a lesson we have not learned from past experience. A survey of Bren guns was carried out in 1953-58 with the same background and with a view to providing DP guns to the service.

Due to the expansion in the army and with weapons being issued to Border Security Forces and others, the whole problem takes on a greater magnitude and involves for greater expenditure. This is a field where economy can be revelled in.

One last word, however, is required and I feel without it, article may not carry the message intended. This is the question of standardisation. It is necessary for examination of production and practising of economy to decide and put into effect within a time frame of say 5-10 years standardisation of all Infantry Small Arms. It is too long since we last carried out this exercise—20 years ago. We standardised on the 303 round used by Rifle, LMG and MMG. It is now necessary to get down to a Rifle LMG and MMG all firing the same 7.62 round or whatever round it is decided that we standardise on. In terms of logistics production and supply, this is as important and as urgent an aspect as the selection and training of a soldier.

We have the experience, the technique, the know how and the capacity. Let us pursue both survey and standardisation with a sense of urgency.

## CONCLUSION

It is necessary to carry out a general survey of small arms once every so many years, the period dicided on being related to

1.A AHSP—Authority Holding Sealed Particulars i.e., Chief Inspector of Small Arms Ichapur, the sole technical authority in India.

whether the country has been at peace or war. This is necessary because semi-automatic/atuomatic small arms :

(a) do not have Log Books maintained showing the number of rounds fired through them as in the case of artillery pieces or vehicles, which would indicate the precise condition of the weapon, and enable planning of replacements.

(b) the technology of repair and training of technical personnel is a bonus which comes out of a general survey ;

(c) Techniques of maintenance and repair at factory level are kept alive.

(d) and lastly, it is very important to weed out junk rather than spend money on the maintenance and preservation of small arms which should be scrapped and replaced by new manufacture.

# LETTER TO THE EDITOR

The Secretary & Editor
United Services Institution
'Kashmir House'
Rajaji Marg
New Delhi-110011

Sir,

## THE DEFENCE UNIVERSITY CONCEPT

In the July-Sept. 80 issue of the journal, Lt. Gen. Thapan has presented a case for the establishment of a Defence University. In support of this he has put forward the following four factors:

(a) In the mind of the prospective civil employer the Service-man remains a bluff, fit only for watch and ward duties.

(b) Value of Service education remains a closed book to the rest of the society.

(c) The non-recognition of military education by civilian universities.

(d) It will lead to a better integration of the three Services.

Let us examine how far the establishment of a Defence University will fill in any of the above gaps.

### Civilian Impression of an Army Officer

If the civilian society has got a low impression of the Service-man, the fault is that of—

(a) our PR Department having done very little, if at all, to project the image of the soldier, and,

(b) after Independence, our military hierarchy having failed to maintain the dignity and izzat of the fighting man. If the army chooses to denigrate its own creed, it must accept the consequences of lowering its status and prestige in the eyes of the civil public.

No Defence University can restore the lost image and prestige of the Service-man,——this has got to come from within the Services themselves.

### Value of Service Education

Here again it is the fault of our PR Department having totally failed to bring home to the civilian public, the value of Service edu-

cation in the commercial and industrial life. In this respect, the Rehabilitation Organisation has done no better. Unless the task of resettlement is taken up as a normal function of Command, and merged as routine within the existing welfare responsibilities and duties of the three Services, little can be achieved to improve the present situation. In any case a Defence University is no solution to this problem.

Another factor responsible for this lack of knowledge, is our antiquated security system. Instead of encouraging the civilian society to visit military institutions, and mix freely with army personnel, our out moded security system does just the opposite. The fact that, military matters are never discussed threadbare in our Lok Sabha, as is the case in other democratic parliaments and senates, makes this communication gap even more large. Our censured military journals and the press, do not help matters either. It is doubtful, if even this letter will be published !

Besides, we already have a chair in almost all our Universities on Defence Studies. It is not clear how a Defence University is going to fill in this void in the lack of knowledge of the value of military education to the civilian society.

NON RECOGNITION OF SERVICE EDUCATION BY UNIVERSITIES

It is not correct to state that, civilian universities do not recognise army education. Take the AMFC for instance, it is one of the most sought after medical institutes in the Country. Its students, both army and civil, appear for the external examination of the Poona University, whose degree is recognised throughout the Country. No need has ever been felt by the AFMC for giving its own degree,—and even if it does, what additional purpose will it serve ?

On the other hand, if the CME has failed to get its internal examination recognised by the Poona University, the fault is entirely that of the CME. It has persistantly refused to allow its officers to appear for the Poona University examination, and what is even worse, it has even refused to allow outside examiners to set and correct its internal papers. What is the harm if the CME officers also appear for the Poona University examination as is done by medical officers of the AFMC, unless of course the former do not feel technically competent to do so, which perhaps a Defence University will overlook and condone.

BETTER INTEGRATION OF THE SERVICES

Of all the myths of the Defence University, this business of Services integration is its biggest bluff. Ever since Independence, we have never stopped boasting of our inter-Service establishments like the DSSC and NDC. We proudly display the fact that, unlike what is

prevalent even in the more modern armies of UK and USA, the officer in our army begins his career in an inter-Service institution, namely the NDA. The irony however is that, in spite of all the above, for all intents and purposes, we still train and fight as three separate and independent Services, unlike the armed forces of the countries mentioned above, who have long since introduced effective unification of their Services through the office of the Chief of Defence Staff. They did not require a Defence University to bring this about.

Leave alone wanting a Defence University, we must also ask the question, whether, even certain existing training institutions like the CME and AFMC, are really necessary in their existing forms. No other armies that we know of even those of the affluent countries, have found a need for such expensive institutions to form a part of their military entablishments. For example in UK and USA, officers of the Engineer and Medical Corps do their basic education in engineering and medicine in respective universities in these fields. The Service schools (note not colleges) established for these disciplines, cater only for the purely military aspects of engineering and medicine, subjects which are outside the orbit of universities. In our country however, the CME and the AFMC not only cater for the specialised military needs, but also function as any civil university would in respect of the basic academic education leading respectively to an engineering and medical degree. There does not appear to be any justification for duplicating another civil university at the CME or the AFMC, specially so when there is today no dearth of engineering and medical graduates in the civil market, who are as good officer material as the products of the CME or the AFMC, as has been amply proved by their performance in our three wars since Independence. The same argument can also be extended to the basic technical institutions of the other two Services. For example, the basic marine engineering and electrical course at the INS Shivaji, appears to be a duplication of identical basic disciplines of any civil marine engineering college. This is not to advocate the abolition of such Service institutions altogether, but to suggest that, they should only confine themselves to imparting knowledge in the purely military aspects of their respective discipline, to officers who are already technical graduates from the respective civil universities.

## CONCLUSION

The impact made by the current advancement of science and technology on all branches of the armed forces dictates that, the basic academic education of the future Service officer, whether he be a generalist or a specialist, has to be that of a university graduate level. However, whereas other countries, even the more affluent ones, achieve this by imparting to their military officers basic academic education in civil universities, and only sending them to Service schools for specialised military training, we in our

poor country choose to duplicate even the civil university education in our basic Service establishments. Regarding the technical services, we have been made to believe, that the added expenditure is justified on the grounds of quality, namely, that the direct entry university graduates are only the left overs, and the good ones do not join the Services. Possibly this is correct in perspective to what the Services have to offer compared with other more lucrative careers, and is not peculiar to India alone, but the pattern is prevalent in all other countries as well.

To conclude, the basic question to be asked for justifying the establishment of a Defence University is an economic one, in that, when more affluent countries like UK and USA cannot afford the cost of even institutions like CME and AFMC can we, a poor country like India, afford the luxury of a Defence University ? In any case, there is no added advantage to be gained by it, except to enable a BA (Def Uni) to be put against a soldier's name. However, my experience shows that, the chances of him obtaining a civil appointment on this ground alone (as that seems to be prime objective of this exercise) will still remain as remote as at present. A Defence University cannot regain the image, worth and prestige of the Service-man, which has been lowered after Independence — only the character of our military leadership can restore this to its former glory.

Thanking you,

Sikkim Distilleries Ltd.
Rangpo
Sikkim
1 Sept. 81

Brig N B Grant (Retd) AVSM

# BOOK REVIEWS

OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS AND INDIAN DEFENCE
UTPAL K. BANERJEE

(Published by Concept Publishing Coy. New Delhi 1980)
pp. 766 price Rs. 180/-)

THE book entitled "Operational Analysis and Indian Defence" by Dr. Utpal K. Banerjee makes laudable attempt at providing some conceptual and theoretical framework that is integral to the periodic programme, budgeting and information—feeding process linked with continual perception and evaluation threats in the variable time-frame, for a wide variety of management and planning problems in the context of Indian defence. The use of all this is extended to an internal environment concerning insurgency in India and some possible countermeasures. Economy of insurgency-affected areas is looked at in the process of development planning and winning hearts and minds is considered as a necessary part in the venture of winning over the whole people. Some case studies are attempted with the help of analytical models enunciated in the book that are amenable to computer solution. It ends with an appeal for an extensive use of this analytical technique for the Indian policy-making apparatus in Defence. The book provides a readable material for use by one with a reasonable background of operational research.

—MPM

PEACE KEEPER'S HANDBOOK
INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY

(Published by International Peace Academy publication, New York, 1978 pp.)

THIS book which may aptly be called an International Peace-Keeping Manual, aims at educating the prospective participants, both civilian and military, in international third-party peace-keeping. Foreworded by Major-General I. J. Rikhye, President of the International Peace Academy, it presently contains eleven chapters, with another entitled "The Law and International Peace-Keeping" to follow.

Chapter-I gives a theoretical framework, purpose and structure of the book: Chapter-II describes the main organs of the U.N., indicating their functions in relation to international peace and security; Chapter-III sets out the principles on which is based the current policy of U.N. Peace-Keeping: Chapter-IV gives a detailed overview of standing operating procedures; Chapter-V explains the skill and technuiqe

requirements for the chief aspects of a peace-keeper's duties : Observation, Surveillence and Supervision, Interposition, Patrolling and Reporting, Investigation of Complaints, Negotiation and Mediation, and Information Gathering; Chapter-VI explains the organisation and procedures for the logistics support of a U.N. operation at U.N. Headquarters level, Force Headquarters level, and National Contingent level; Chapter-VII explains the organisation and structure of the Communications system within a U.N. Force, and describes the working procedure for internal/external radio and line transmission of messages; Chapter-VIII describes the role and responsibilities of the Military Economics and Humanitarian Relief Office of a U.N. Force, indicating how its work relates to that of a Force's political and legal department and to a companion U.N. Civilian (Relief) Operation where one existst Chapter-IX emphasises the need for military thinking in respect of skill and technique training for U.N. peace-keeping operations, and also suggests ways in which soldier and civilian peace-keepers can be prepared in their own countries for service in a U.N. Force or Mission; Chapter-X describes the role rerponsibilities of civilian police (UNCIVPOL) when deployed as part of a U.N. Force; and Chapter-XI explains the organisation and procedure employed by the UN and its Forces/Missions to facilitate good public relations and an effective press information service, so that accurate and objective reporting of the Force's/Mission's operations is available for world public consumption.

"The Handbook is designated to assist the process of preparation for participation in international third party peace-keeping. Directed primarily at national armed forces for use in military (and other service) Staff and Training Colleges, it has a relavance also for Ministries of Foreign/External Affairs and of the Interior, international and non-governmental organisations, and for students of conflict research at universities and at institutes for the study of conflict and its resolution ..... ..... .....the Handbook will also constitute an operational notebook which can be carried on operations and used as an aide memoire by individual officers and non-commissioned officers, thus envisaging a wide distribution for the Handbook".

The personality of the peace-maker or peace-keeper is very important in his conflict-resolution task. He must combine in himself an approachable, understanding and tactful manner with fairness and firmness. Quiet diplomacy and reasoning on the part of the peace-maker achieves for more than arrogance, anger, disdain, coercion or sarcasm. Above all, he should acquire the confidence and trust of the disputing parties.

This book is the first of its kind. It will, no doubt, be useful to participants in peace-making or peace-keeping operations, as well as to diplomats, other government officials and UN functionaries who plan

and programme such operations, besides others who want to know about them.

—BC

WORLD POLITICS AND THE ARAB-ISARELI CONFLICT

ROBERT O' FREEDMAN

(Published by Pergamori Press, N.Y. pp. 344, price $ 39.00)

THE Middle East in general and the region of the Persian Gulf in particular has been a key area of super power rivalry since the Afghanistan crises and the revolution in Iran. In this confrontation, the Arab-Israeli problem is a basic issue which has significant bearing on the stability of the region. This regional conflict has, as the Editor of the book under review points out in his introduction, been intertwined with world politics. "Virtually all the great powers sought to exploit the opportunities created by the Arab-Israeli conflict to increase their influence in the Middle East."

This book analyses the Arab-Israeli conflict from the point of view of the super powers, considers regional influences and domestic problems of Israel, Egypt, Syria and the Palestine. Thus the reader gets a good understanding both of various view points as well as the complexity of the problem.

After World War I, Zionism and Arab nationalism coexisted for a while and co-operated during the Paris Peace conference. In March 1919 Faisal wrote to Felix Frankfurter, the American Zionist leader, "We feel that Ihe Arabs and the Jews are cousins in race.....There is room in Syria for both". The British and the French did not permit an independent Arab State (Syria with Palestine as a province). The British formed Palestine under their mandate west of the Jordon river and established a seperate Arab state under Abdullah—Transjordon. The mandate for Palestine further accentuated differences and diminished any possibility of a compromise. The establishment of the Jewish National Home, was part of the Mandate; article 6 of which undertook to 'facilitate Jewish immigration'. The differing claims of the two communities; cultural, linguistic and socio economic, led to what 'The Peel Commission' of 1937 described as "an irrepressible conflict" and suggested a partition. Although the White Paper of 1939 restricted Jewish immigrants to 75,000 over the next 5 years and accepted termination of immigration thereafter, World War II overtook events. After the War, the British took the case to the United Nations. The UNCOP recommended partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. However, when the Mandate was terminated on 15 May 1948, the Arabs invaded Palestine, lost the war as well as the remainder of the eastern part of the proposed Palestenian Arab State, which was annexed by Abdullah of Transjordon.

Subsequent developments have been governed primarily by the super power interests. The US involvement and the Soviet goals in the Middle East have been analysed in Part I of the book. Although the joint US-Soviet statement of October 1977 called for a Geneva conference, Sadats visit to Jerusalem split with Arab states and Geneva was cancelled. At that stage it had been hoped that the Soviet Union could use its influence to make both Syria and the PLO agree to a peace settlement.

Part II of the book examines 'Regional Perspective'; Inter-Arab politics, Arab regional politics, Iran and the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as the Horn of Africa and the Arab-Israel conflict. Al-Qawmiyya Al-Arabiyya (Pan Arabism) and Wataniyya (State Nationalism), the two major trends in Arab politics are discussed. From the Wataniyya point of view, conflict with Israel is costly and dangerous and should be avoided. Most of the Arab world is therefore seen to have come to the position of accepting coexistence with Israel. Nevertheless, the conflict with Israel continues to be a source of division for the Arab states. Sadat's detente diplomacy has further sharpened the differences. At the end of a summit conference in Tripoli, Libya announced the creation of a coalition (Iraq, Libya, Syria, South Yemen and the PLO) called the Front of Steadfastness and confrontation on 5 December 1977.

A chapter explains Iran's attitude in the light of its perceived political and strategic assessment. This was to limit Soviet influence, creating an effective Iranian–Israeli obstacle to increasing Soviet Power and influence. However, in the 1973 war, Iran extended help to the Arabs and was pleased to see the friendly anti-Soviet Sadat regime make a good show in the battlefield. The other explanation for the change in Iran's position is that the 1973 war did not aim to destroy Israel to recover the territory lost in the 1967 War.

Part III of the book deals with domestic perspectives; Israeli, Palestenian, Egyption and Syrian politics. Moderate political parties in Israel are seen to have sought only the acceptance of Israel but the conviction of Arab hostility changed their objective to one of ability to defend itself militarily. However, the Herut party under the leadership of Begin, has always proclaimed the aim of establishing a Jewish state upto the Jordon River. Although Israel won the 1967 war convincingly and occupied large tracts of Arab lands, the Arab attitude did not change. They continued to hold that there could be no negotiations, no recognition and no peace with Israel. The result of 1977 election in Israel threw out the Labour Party and pointed to the deep district of Arab intentions.

The political aims of the Palestenians have come round to the acceptance of partition. By occupying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the 1967 War, Israel gained control of almost half the

Palestenians. The Palestenian National Council's appeal of March 1977, talks of establishing a balance 'between our legitimate aspirations and the possibilities', and limits its programme to Israeli evacuation of Arab lands (restoration of the borders of 4 June 1967).

The problems of the Middle East are so complex and the forces at work so variable that none of contributing authors have tried to forecast future trends. All the same, the book provides a sound analysis of various factors and is of great value in understanding the issues involved.

—AMV

SOUTH-WEST ASIAN CRISIS

ED. BY D.D. KHANNA.

(Published by Naya Prakash Calcutta, 1981 pp. 162, price 75/-)

"SOUTH-West Asian Crises" is a book based on three different sessions of a seminar which was held under the auspices of the Department of Defence Studies of the University of Allahabad in the wake of the Russian entry into Afganistan.

The book has been edited by Prof. D.D. Khanna who has done considerable amount of study on military history and on contemporary problems which beset the world.

Inspite of skillful collation, the end product is a collection of disparate essays, albeit on the same subject, viz South West Asia.

Hence this book is not for a casual reader, but for a serious student on the subject who is interested in the views of experts who look at it from varied angles.

On reading the book one cannot but greatly regret the fact that most of the authors have tried to whitewash Soviet action in Afganistan, rather than roundly condemn the blatant aggression as it rightly deserves to be.

A super power occupies a hapless neighbouring country because—as stated by one author—it felt that "Pakistan, China and USA were trying to interfere in the internal affairs of Afganistan". By which norm can this line of argument be supported ? Can we condone the act of a dacoit who loots a house because he feels that some of the servants are trying to steal a transister ?

Apart from this failing, some very cogent points have been raised, viz that Iranian revolution had an unsettling effect on USSR, US interest is oil while that of USSR is its security and USSR has pre-empted in Afganistan what US may do in Iran.

What should really have been highlighted was the great disservice done to India by the USSR. Super power rivalry is now on our doorstep, the Indian Ocean—which the littoral states had hoped

would become a zone of peace—is now a cesspool of super power rivalry (this bedes ill for India), Pakistan will now be helped in a big way by USA, some western countries, China, Japan and the muslim countries (thus the entire balance in the region would be changed) and finally our standing in the non-aligned world has suffered.

An interesting fallacy has been exploded by General WAG Pinto, that once the nuclear war starts, escalation would take place in a graded response. It must be clearly understood that nuclear war will be total and intense with each side throwing in its nuclear might before its opponent can. Hence "graded response" is but a wishful hope.

In a world of hard and cruel politics, Mr OP Bhatnagar interjects a pious statment, that "mutual trust and cooperation are needed to solve the Afganistan problem". It would be interesting to see how the Afgans react to such a statement.

A book which is priced at Rs. 75/- could have included a good map of the region. The quality of print is poor and a number of printer's devils have crop in. On page 76 "scan" is printed instead of "scant". On page 82 it is stated "Let's make to mistake".

– MSC

LESSONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCTOBER WAR
BY COL BK NARAYAN

(Published by Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1977 pp 95, Price Rs. 35/-)

COL Narayan is one of the few Indian writers who is an expert on politico-military Arab affairs in view of his experience, his assiduous study and vast knowledge of Arabic language. He is widely travelled and is acquainted with most of the Arab politicians and military personalties. He has done many other books on the Arab-Israeli war. In this book he has put the strategic considerations and perspectives and tried to bring out strategic and tactical lessons of Oct 73 War from the point of view of both adversaries. The book is well catalouged and indexed with photo slides of actions during the war and his visit to Cairo to attend the international seminar held in Oct 75.

For reasons best known to the author, he has not mentioned the vital role played by the Gen Shazly, Chief of Army Staff, Egyptian Army, during this war.

The printer's devil has also strucked at places ; for example in the name of Rear Admiral Fuad Zakri at pages 15 and 86.

Lastly the aspect of the use oil as a weapon has been very lucidly brought out in the book.

Overall a delightful and educative reading for a soldier ; for the less specialisation reader, it is an exciting a highly literate soldier.

—RSS

OUR ENDLESS WAR : INSIDE VIETNAM.
By TRAN VAN DON.
(Published by Presidio Press, London, 1978,
pp. 274 $ 12.95)

MANY hundreds, even thousands, of Indians have served in Vietnam during the period covered by Gen Dong. After the war the 20th Indian Division were the first allies to arrive and as Dong complains handed the country back the French a year after the Japanese had given Emperor Bao Dai independence. The French after procrastinating in their negotiations provoked Ho Chi Minh to country-wide conflict, which only ended in Dien Bien Phu. The Geneva agreement of 1954, designed to insulate Vietnam till the elections after two years, was circumvented by the S. Vietnamese and the USA, who had taken over from the French the tutelage of SVN. Under president Diem a political and Military base was established. Diem's persecution of the Buddhists and shows of independence from the US led to his downfall and US approval for his removal in which Gen. Dong played a leading role. Gen. (big) Minh the seniormost plotter is put in charge but is soon replaced in another coup by Gen. Khanh and a younger group of generals, including Thieu. The author is removed along with other Generals and is accused of neutralism which probably included overtures with the enemy. Released, Dong remains out of the top echelons of SVN leadership though he did special missions and even thought of another coup.' He in the meanwhile joined the senate and in the last days of the Republic was called to the government, just in time for its dissolution and his own flight. Big Minh hoping to parley with the NLF is bundled off unceremoniously by the troops of the enemy. Dong's story is over.

The biggest lacuna in the book is, not unnaturally, the period when Dong was out of office, when the massive US intervention took place and over half a million troops and a vast air and sea armada concentrated on Vietnam. How and why did they prove insufficient ? Dong neither describes nor explains satisfactorily this all important part of SVN history, and less so the background of world forces at work.

The disintergration of the SVN Army over one million strong is easier to diagnose : bad and thoroughly corrupt leadership with vast difference between officers and men, road bound concepts of Warfare, requiring massive air and ground support; the situation of the men's families was such that they had nowhere to live and often had to be

practically in the front line; in the recruits barracks placards appraled "dont desert." Against them were troops with years of battle experience. Who could dig like moles, and whose supplies were manhandled or carried by bicycles across any terrain; and who had defeated the French in pitched battle.

US intelligence maps showed enemy troops in strength all over South Vietnam; but during the almost daily sorties that took place with flocks of helicopters preceded by carpet bombing, usually they found nothing, or at most a few villagers. The enemy controlled the village most of the time, except when these raids took place, and their ruthless tactics and reprisals commanded obedience. The Korean troops who were known for their own brand of ruthlessness had comparative peace and calm around their two division areas. In their bombing of the North which was devastating, the US were not allowed to bomb certain key areas such as the Haiphong docks and other lines of communication. Such presumably were the rules that were considered necessary to keep the USSR and China from more active intervention. The US anti war movement grew apace : the wrong war, in the wrong place with the wrong enemy. Nixon had no greater success, and with his brilliant adviser succeeded in changing the global strategic scrue chaling Northern to China, which meant giving up South Vietnam. As Thieu pathetically puts it in the last words to Kissinger when the extent of the secret agreement with the north are disclosed to him".....Vietnam has become for the Americans a dot on the globe....."Bring back the troops became the slogan for Nioxon's 1972 elections, and Nixons assurances to Thieu which are reprinted in the appendix of the book were forgotten in the Watergate storm, the assurance to help if invaded. In the same appendix is the only reference to India; it is an explanation to Thieu why the Americans could not get Japan included in the control commission that was setup to supervise the new agreement; if Japan was included he said India would have had to come also, and that, we are left to infer, would be anathema.

The world picture had also changed since the days of Dulles; a new third world had been emancipated; Vietnam could have joined it even after the war when Ho had asked Bao Dai to head the state. It would not have made much difference except for a million and half killed and wounded in one of the most remarkable of wars between the elephant and the ants.

Dong's writing is very effective, particularly in the earlier and later period when he had power or was himself a witness. His English is simple and appealing, with just that bit of French showing to give it pathos and Gallic irony. His modesty does not allow him to do justice

to the qualities of his own people. whose deep culture, sturdy character and indomitable will has conquered many conquerors.

MAR

THE PACIFIC WAR, 1931-1945 : A CRITICAL PROSPECTIVE ON JAPAN's ROLE IN WORLD WAR II
SABURO IENAGA
(Published by Pantheon Books, New York, 1978, pp. 316,
Price £ 3.95)

THIS is a courageous book written by a Japanese historian, laying bare the aggressive, expansionist policy of the Japanese rulers and the concomitant brutalities committed on the enslaved nations as well as their own population at home during 1931-1945. The author is a pacifist, humanist and democrat. To him the Pacific War did not begin with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, but in 1931 which they attacked China in violation of the Kellogg-Briand Non-Aggression Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty on China. This "made Japan more isolated and desperate and ultimately led to war with America and England."

Japan is a remarkable Asian country which started modernizing herself very rapidly to catch up with the West in science and technology after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, but unfortunately she followed in the footsteps of the colonial Western countries in occupying Asian lands illegally by the force of arms. "They competed with the West for a place at the imperialist table and a slice of the Chinese melon." Also, Japan did not learn much from the democratic traditions and human values of the West. The result was that she followed an ambitious policy of territorial expansion at the cost of her neighbours which was beyond her capacity to implement. The vaulting ambition of her rulers made them blind to the realities of the situation and the sufferings of her own people who were denied all democratic rights, despite the People's Rights movement in Japan in the 1880s. Japanese victories in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), and the annexation of Korea in 1910 had whetted her appetite further and further and the result was that in the 1930s she embarked upon a war of aggresssion in China and later challenged the United States of America by bombing Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941.

The Japanese proved their bravery, fine strategy and tactics during the Second World War, but often they demonstrated their apathy to human values and inflicted inhuman sufferings on the adversary as well as themselves out of a false sense of heroism and patriotism. For instance, the 1908 army criminal code contained the following :—"A commander who allows his unit to surrender to the enemy without

fighting to the last man or who concedes a stratrgic area to the enemy shall be punishable by death." The Field Service Code, issued in 1941, under the Japanese Army Minister's signature, snid : "Do not be taken prisoner alive." In Nanking tens of thousands of Chinese prisoners of war and stragglers were massacred, and in Peking, thousands in civilian clothes, who looked like soldiers, were machine-gunned, and latter the coolies, who were employed in throwing those dead bodies into the siver, were lined upon the river bank and machine-gunned, their bodies tumbling into the river. "There are about 20,000 dead Chinese there," reported a Japanese officer. The author says that in addition to the looting and killing of noncombatants, other Violations of the international rules of warfare were the Japanese use of poison gas in the Shanshi province of China (p. 187), the 731 Units research in bacteriological warefare, and the cruel vivisection experiments conducted at Kynsha Imperial University on captured U.S. airmen.

According to the author, Lt.-General Ishii Shire, a medical doctor who was the head of the 731 unit, was not arrested or charged with war crimes by the Americans who allegedly used his discoveries and techniques in their germ war base during the Korean War.

In the Philippines, starving bands of Japanese soldiers killed stragglers from other Japanese units and ate their flesh. "Long before their defeat in battle, the professional military were morally bankrupt." The Japanese soldiers also forced their civilian compatriots to commit suicide rather than become prisoners of war.

Externally, Japan followed an anti-democratic policy by allying herself with Hitler, the aggressor of Europe, and concluding the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany, estensibly to stem the spread of Communism. But when Germany suddenly concluded an opportunistic Non-aggressian Pact with USSR on the night of August 23-24, 1939, Japan suffered a diplomatic set-back and signed the Japan-Soviet Neutrality pact in Moscow in April 1941. But unfortunately for Japan, Germany broke its treaty with Russia and invaded the latter on June 22, 1941, and the Japanese also wanted to follow suit, but preferred to turn its attention to South-East Asia and the Pacific.

In her war with the British and the Americans, Japan initially accomplished some outstanding feats in weaponry technology and tactics, (Zero aircraft, I-type model 400 submarine, No. 93 torpedo, etc), but in the long run, she was defeated by America's enormous economic and productive power. However Professor Saburo Lenaga has given much credit to the Chinese resistance. He says : "America's material superiority may have struck the dicisive blow, but Japan had already been defeated by Chinese democracy. This is crucial to an understanding of the essence of the war from 1931 to 1945.....It is unscientific and unscholarly to analyse the war only through some

dramatic battles in the Pacific. The conflict was more than a clash of armies and navies. It was a struggle of political values : the democracy of China versus the militaristic absolutism of Japan." (p. 96).

Curiously, in page 146 of the book, Subhash Chandra Bose's name has been given as Changar Bose.

There is no doubt that this critical, but very useful book will strengthen the democratic and peace leving forces in Japan and strike a warning to all war-mongers and aggressors every where.

—BC

DATE OF MAHABHARATA BATTLE
BY S.B. ROY
(Published by Academic Press, Gurgaon Haryana, 1976 pp 223, price Rs. 50/-

THERE are still doubts in the minds of students of history about the dates of certain important events of ancient Indian History, and the date of the Mahabbarata War is one which is debated very keenly. Recently eminent historians in India exchanged volleys over this particular data, and one of them has gone to the extent of declaring that the Mahabharata War never took place. Although it became almost axiomatic to say that ancient Indians never produced historians, nevertheless chronology had an important place in ancient Indian scholarship. It is due to the foreign invasions of the post-Hindu period of Indian history that many chronological links of the ancient period were missing and a coherent historicity could not be established.

Mr. S B Roy, Director of the Institute of Chronology, New Delhi, deserves the thanks of students of Indian history for his untiring work in correcting certain chronological inaccurancies in Indian historical treatises with the help of five methods – literary, archacological, radiocarbon, astronomical, and cross contact. After testing his subject matter on the whetstone of these five methodological investigations, Mr. Roy has come to the conclusion that the date of the Mahabharata war was about 1400 B.C.

Although the search for the correct date through a chronological jungle of facts and figures is by no means easy or pleasent, nonetheless it is very interesting. Scholars of Indian history (ancient period) will, I am sure, find the publication satisfying.

—B.C.

LEADERSHIP IN ITS FINEST MOULD GURU GOBIND SINGH
BY MAJOR RAVI BATRA
(Published by Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandhak Committee Amritsar, 1979. pp. 124 price Rs. 35/-

GURU Gobind Singh's life is a legend to conjure with. Born on December 26, 1666 A.D., this tenth and last guru of the Sikhs

breathed his last on 7 October 1708, before he was forty-two. But during this short span of life he did great things which one rarely comes across in the annals of history of any country in the world. In the field of nationalism and patriotism he had few equals in India during the Middle Ages, when the vast masses of the Indian people were being cruelly oppressed by alien rulers who were religious fanatics of the worst kind. The two other celebrated names of that period that come to our mind are Rana Pratap, the Rajput ruler of Mewar, and Shivaji the Great, the redoubtable antagonist of Aurangzeb. But Rana Pratap was the son of a king, and he had a kingdom and an army of brave Rajputs. Similarly, Shivaji too was the son of a high official in the Court of Bijapur. Guru Gobind Singh, on the other hand, became the head of a small religious sect at the tender age of nine, on the execution of his father Guru Teg Bahadur in Delhi on 11 November, 1675 A.D. He had no army, no treasury, but enemies all around. Aurangzeb was determined to destroy the Sikhs and convert all non-Mulims to Islam. But the new Guru was also equally determined to save Hinduism at all costs. To that end he created the Khalsa, a band of saint-soldiers, whose life-style was modelled on the teachings of Shri Krishna, as propounded in the Geeta and whose religion was to fight against the religious bigotry of the rulers. Guru Gobind Singh had to fight not only against the Mughals but the Hindu rulers of the neighbouring hill States who were in league with the Mughals. It is astonishing to see how this lion-hearted Guru with his great organizing skill, unparalleled military genius, nobility of character, utter selflessness and supreme self-sacrifice achieved his aim. Even though he had defeated in battles by the enemy on several occasions due to the latter's overwhelming numerical superiority in men and arms, his strong will to resist could not be vanquished. So, he continued to fight again and again till the adversary made peace with him. Many agree with Bulle Shah who versified thus :

"I do not say of this time,
I do not say of that time,
Had Guru Gobind Singh not been there,
All would have been converted to Islam."
(translation of his poem)

One famous historian has observed that had the Hindu "Rajas followed the Guru's advice and not opposed him, India would have been independent two hundred fifty years earlier."

The Guru's sacrifices are well-known. His two elder sons of young age lay down their lives on the battle field and the two younger sons were buried alive by the enemy. He himself led his followers into all the battles he fought and suffered wounds and privations of the worst kind. But he asked his followers to show respect to women and children even of the enemy and to treat equally the wounded of both

sides after the battle was over. He believed in the equality of all men and asked his followers not to worship him as a god. He established the superiority of the Khalsa over himself and never thought of self-aggrendizement or the interests of his own family. That is why he abolished individual Guruship and made the holy book of the Sikhs as the Guru after him. Although a great military leader, he never behaved like a dictator, although he was revered like god by his followers, he never called himself God or an incarnation of Him, but considered himself to be an ordinary mortal; although he became victorious against the Mughals, he never tried to establish his kingship or a kingdom. He and his family shared common food with his soldiers and never lived in pomp or luxury. His life is really unique in history. He turned jackals into lions through the baptism of sword, and his sparrows defeated the royal hawks. He had no animosity towards the Muslims as such. He made use of Pathan soldiers, besides Rajputs, to train his army. He was the eternal enemy of injustice, tyranny, oppression and religious persecution. He was a poet, writer, and lover of music, skilled in playing the 'Tans' and well-versed in Persian, Punjabi and Hindi. He was a great nationalist who considered Hindustan, as mentioned in the Adi Granth, as his homeland (he never used the word 'Punjab' anywhere). "He has called Bengal as his spiritual homeland, as mentioned in one of his letters addressed to his followers in Dacca." (P. 92), Although he helped Bahadur Shah to succeed Aurangzeb, but he refused to ally with him for the subjugation of the Marathas or the Rajput princes. He destroyed the barriers of caste amongst his followers and recruited soldiers from lower castes also. He vehemently described the dowry system and said : "He who giveth his daughter in marriage to a Sikh and taketh no money for her, is a Sikh of mine, and shall after his death, reach my abode." (p. 97). The author has aptly described the guru as "a true 'Yogi', a practical leader of men, a mystic, a saint, a great military general and a poet." (p. 98)

Maj. R. Batra has, in has book, dealt with the contemporary situation in India, the life of the Guru, aims and means of Guru Gobind's military career, his battles with tactical lessons, an analysis of the Guru's generalship, an assessment of his military leadership, his character and achievements, what the present-day soldier can learn from him, and what people at larger can learn from the Guru's life. The author has inscribed quotations from the writings of various persons, besides Guru Gobind Singh's, at the top of every page of this book which appear to be superfluous. In stead of this, it would have been better if quotations only from the 10th Guru" writings were provided. Some of the Guru's words are memorable, for example, "If war is for the privileged and martyrdom in combat is the ultimate honour" ; "Sword is God and God is Sword," etc, The famous

historian, Arnold Toynbee, has said "Guru Gobind Singh anticipated Lenin by a couple of centuries. He was a true socialist in thought, word and deed." The author has discussed, how from the Guru's military tactics, leadership and personal lifestyle, the present day's soldiers can learn a lot as regards military training, discipline, espirit-de-corps, morale, motivation, man-management, character building and combat leading. He has suggested that on the model of the Guru's Baisakhi day, once a month, the unit commander and all ranks should gather at a central place to pledge loyalty to the country, and devotion to duty. Such was the personality of the Guru and so much were the people, even women and children, impressed by his teachings that the 40 deserters from the Guru's Army who had left him during the siege of Anandpur were so badly shamed by their women folk in their respective villages that they came back to the Guru to sacrifice their lives in the battle of Khidrana. Besides, Mai Bhago donned military dress and fought most courageously with the Khalsa comrades in the same battle. About military prepardness, the Guru said that people "must not be caught unprepared if the challenge came from any source at any time." (p. 131).

Although the book does not have an Index, it has good bibliography appended at the end. The author should be congratulated for writing such a useful book which should be purchased by every library in the country and read by every person, especially our soldiers and the younger generation.

B.C.

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